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Abstract
A buyer needs to procure a good from either of two potential suppliers oﬀering diﬀerentiated products
and with privately observed costs. The buyer privately observes the own valuations for the products and
(ex ante) decides how much of this information should be revealed to suppliers before they play a ﬁrst score
auction. We show that the more signiﬁcant is each supplier’s private information on the own cost, the less
information the buyer should reveal. Part of our analysis is linked to the comparison between a ﬁrst and
a second price auction in an asymmetric setup with a distribution shift.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we study a procurement auction in which the auctioneer is a (male) buyer interested in
purchasing an object that can be supplied by two diﬀerent (female) suppliers; each supplier is privately
informed about her own production cost. The suppliers oﬀer diﬀerentiated products, and the buyer is
interested both in the price he pays and in the degree of ﬁtness of a product with his own needs — the latter
is a sort of ”quality assessment” of the object from the buyer’s subjective point of view.1 We assume that
the buyer’s assessments of the products’ qualities are not observed by suppliers, and we inquire how much
(if any) of his assessments the buyer should reveal to suppliers before the bidding process. Our main result
is that (under suitable assumptions on the distributions of costs and qualities) the more signiﬁcant is each
supplier’s private information on the own cost, the less information on qualities the buyer should reveal.
The literature on procurement when quality matters often analyzes multidimensional auction models in
which the buyer announces a scoring rule, and then each bidder makes a multi-dimensional bid specifying
both a price and quality level(s): see Che (1993), Branco (1997), Asker and Cantillon (2008, 2010). How-
ever, a few papers consider settings in which the buyer subjectively evaluates the quality of each product,
and inquire the impact of diﬀerent information disclosure strategies on the outcome of the auction: see for
instance Gal-Or et al. (2007), Rezende (2009), Kostamis et al. (2009), and Kaplan (2011) for theoretical
analyses; Haruvy and Katok (2010) and Thomas and Wilson (2011) rely on experimental methods for some
speciﬁc parameter values.
These issues are relevant, for instance, in electronic procurement auctions in which buyers often evaluate
the qualities of diﬀerent oﬀers according to their own individual tastes, and the inﬂuence of non-price
attributes is proved by the common use of ”non-binding” auctions, in which a buyer is not bound to
select a bidder who submitted the lowest price (as documented by the above mentioned papers). A
further application of these family of models is represented by conservation auctions. These auctions are
competitive mechanisms adopted by some governments (see for instance the Conservation Reserve Program
in the US and the Bush Tender Program in Australia) to allocate ﬁnancial subsidies to farmers in exchange
for the implementation of natural resource management programs on their lands. In that context, each
farmer privately knows his opportunity cost from joining the program, while the regulator privately knows
the program’s environmental beneﬁts on each speciﬁc land (see Chan et al., 2003). Cason et al. (2003)
study experimentally how diﬀerent disclosure policies of the regulator’s information aﬀect the outcome.
The starting point for our analysis is a model studied by Gal-Or et al. (2007) (GGD henceforth), in
which the products’ qualities are realization of i.i.d. random variables that the buyer privately observes. A
ﬁrst score auction is held in which each supplier bids a price, and the product with the highest diﬀerence
between quality and price is selected. However, before observing the qualities the buyer commits to one
of three possible information revelation policies: public revelation (PU henceforth), private revelation
(PR), and concealment (C). Under policy PU, before the auction the buyer publicly discloses his quality
assessments for each product; under policy PR, he reveals to each supplier only the quality of the supplier’s
product; under policy C, he does not reveal any information. Hence, the stage of information revelation is
an additional (intermediate) stage with respect to a standard auction procedure.2 Clearly, the information
1In some cases the buyer’s assessments take into account some features of a supplier i — such as the supplier’s reliability
and logistic costs — as long as they are going to aﬀect the buyer’s payoﬀ from choosing the product of supplier i.
2Notice that (as already remarked by GGD) PR does not require private communication from the buyer to each supplier.
Precisely, in order to implement policy PR it suﬃces that the buyer announces the diﬀerent attributes of a product he
takes into account and the weights he assigns to each attribute in order to determine the degree of ﬁt. After receiving this
information, each supplier can determine the quality of the own product as seen by the buyer.
2a supplier receives before the auction aﬀects her bidding, and thus the buyer chooses a policy in view of
the ensuing suppliers’ behavior in the auction. Assuming that suppliers are risk neutral and have identical
and commonly known costs, GGD prove that the buyer is indiﬀerent between PR and PU, and prefers
these policies to C under suitable restrictions on the distribution of qualities.
We assume that there are only two suppliers, and introduce in this environment a privately observed
production cost for each supplier, which can be high (cH) or low (cL) with σ ≡ cH − cL.3 In our model
therefore each agent holds some relevant private information, which considerably complicates the analysis
with respect to the setting of GGD, especially for policy C. As a consequence, in our study of this policy we
need to assume that each product’s quality is uniformly distributed over an interval, with θ > 0 denoting
the interval length.4
We derive equilibrium bidding under each of the three information policies, and then study the buyer’s
preferences over the policies. Our main result states that the buyer’s preferred policy is PU for small values
of the ratio σ/θ, is PR for intermediate values of σ/θ, and is C for large values of σ/θ. Therefore, the
amount of information the buyer should reveal (weakly) decreases monotonically with respect to σ/θ: the
more relevant is the suppliers’ private information on costs, with respect to the maximal quality diﬀerence
between products, the less information on qualities the buyer should reveal to suppliers.
In order to discuss this result for the comparison between PU and PR, we notice that in both these
policies each supplier learns the quality of the own product, and this makes the ﬁrst score procurement
auction equivalent to a ﬁrst price auction (FPA henceforth) with two bidders in which the auctioneer is
the seller of an object, and for each bidder i the value of the object is given by the diﬀerence between her
quality qi and her cost ci. Indeed, when supplier i with quality qi chooses a bid pi, she implicitly oﬀers a
score qi − pi to the buyer. Thus we can express her choice problem in terms of selecting a score, and in
case of victory her payoﬀ is given by her valuation, qi−ci, minus the score oﬀered, like in a standard FPA.
Under policy PR the suppliers’ valuations are i.i.d., thus standard auction results apply. In particular,
the supplier with the highest value wins, and (by revenue equivalence) the buyer’s payoﬀ is equal to the
expected second highest valuation, as in a second price auction (SPA henceforth). Under policy PU,
given q1,q2 announced by the buyer — with q2 > q1 to ﬁx the ideas — the set of possible valuations is
{q1−cH,q1−cL} for bidder 1 and {q2−cH,q2−cL} for bidder 2. This is an asymmetric auction environment
in which the asymmetry is generated by a distribution shift with size q2−q1. For the purposes of comparison
we can view the buyer’s payoﬀ under PR, given q1,q2, as the expected second highest valuation in the above
asymmetric setting. Therefore the ranking between PR and PU is closely related to the ranking between
the FPA and the SPA in an asymmetric setting with a distribution shift. For this sort of asymmetry,
Maskin and Riley (2000) and Kirkegaard (2011) prove that with continuously distributed valuations (and
under some regularity conditions) the FPA is superior to the SPA. However, the valuations in our setting
have binary supports and we obtain an opposite result for the case of a small shift. In fact, somewhat
counterintuitively, a shift which is small with respect to σ reduces the buyer’s payoﬀ in PU (whereas it
increases the buyer’s payoﬀ in PR) because it induces supplier 1 (the disadvantaged supplier) to bid less
aggressively.5 This suggests that PR is better than PU for a large σ/θ. On the other hand, under PU a
3Colucci et al. (2011) consider the framework of GGD but assume that suppliers have diﬀerent production costs, which
are still common knowledge. Thus suppliers are asymmetric ex ante.
4With reference to policy C in a setting similar to our, Thomas and Wilson (2011) claim that "theoretical characterization
of equilibrium behavior in the settings we consider remains an open problem" to explain their use of experimental methods.
5This fact is explored in detail in Doni and Menicucci (2011), which analyze equilibrium bidding in the FPA with two
bidders when the valuations are asymmetrically distributed with binary supports. For the same setting, they compare the
seller’s revenue in the FPA with the revenue in the SPA.
3large shift with respect to σ gives supplier 2 (the preferred supplier), a large advantage with respect to
supplier 1, and this induces her to bid aggressively enough to outbid supplier 1 whatever are the realized
costs. This is the so-called ”Getty eﬀect”, described in Maskin and Riley (2000), and it makes the payoﬀ
of the buyer under PU larger than under PR for a small σ/θ (from GGD we know that PR is better than
C for small σ/θ, thus PU is superior to C as well).
When σ/θ is large, C emerges as the optimal policy because it is eﬀective in controlling suppliers’ rents.
Precisely, for a large σ/θ under policy C a supplier with cost cL always wins when facing a supplier with
cost cH — as a consequence the highest valuation supplier always wins — and in Subsection 3.1 we show
that this makes the suppliers’ rents independent of σ/θ.6 Conversely, under PR standard auction theory
suggests that suppliers’ rents are given by the expected diﬀerence between the highest and the second
highest valuation, and considering the states of the world in which suppliers have diﬀerent costs reveals
that this expectation is increasing in σ/θ. Since C and PR generate the same social surplus as the winner
is always eﬃciently selected, it is intuitive that C is superior to PR (and superior to PU as well, as PR is
better than PU for a large σ/θ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the model, Section 3 derives the
suppliers’ equilibrium behavior for each information policy, and Section 4 examines the buyer’s preferences
over the three polices. Section 5 concludes oﬀering some suggestions for further research. The appendix
contains the proofs of all our results.
2 The model
In our setting a male buyer denoted with B needs to buy a certain object (for instance, an industrial ﬁrm
needs to procure an input) and faces two female suppliers which can provide the object. Supplier i, for
i = 1,2, privately observes the own production cost ci ∈ {cL,cH}; we use σ ≡ cH − cL > 0 to denote the
diﬀerence between cH and cL. Furthermore, (c1,c2) are i.i.d. with λ ≡ Pr{ci = cL} ∈ (0,1).
The products oﬀered by the suppliers are diﬀerentiated and for each supplier i there is a parameter
qi ∈ [q, ¯ q], with θ ≡ ¯ q − q > 0, which represents the degree of ﬁtness of i’s product with B’s needs; in a
sense, qi represents the quality of product i from the subjective point of view of B. Precisely, if B buys
the object oﬀered by supplier i and pays pi, then his payoﬀ is qi − pi; we use si to denote the diﬀerence
between qi and pi, which we call the score oﬀered by supplier i to B. The buyer is risk neutral and uses a
ﬁrst score auction in which suppliers simultaneously submit bids p1 ≥ 0,p2 ≥ 0, and then B buys product
i such that qi − pi > qj − pj (that is such that si > sj),7 paying pi to supplier i and nothing to j. We
suppose that each supplier i is risk neutral and that she wants to maximize (pi −ci) times her probability
of winning. For each supplier i we deﬁne vi ≡ qi −ci as the value of supplier i; thus vi is the social surplus
which is generated if B buys product i.
Before running the auction, B observes the values q1,q2 but suppliers do not: each supplier views q1,q2
as uniformly distributed over Q ≡ [q, ¯ q]×[q, ¯ q],8 and stochastically independent of (c1,c2). Before observing
q1,q2, B has the same beliefs as the suppliers about q1,q2, and we inquire whether at this stage B should
commit to a policy of no information revelation (concealment policy, denoted by C), or to a policy in which
he will reveal to each supplier i only the value of qi (private revelation policy, denoted by PR), or to a
6In fact, this property implies that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists under policy C if σ/θ is suﬃciently large.
7In order to ﬁx the ideas, we suppose that each supplier wins with probability 1
2 in case of tie. However, the equilibrium
outcomes we ﬁnd do not depend on this assumption.
8Some of our results (Propositions 2, 3 and 5) do not depend on this assumption.
4policy in which he will publicly reveal both q1,q2 (public revelation policy, denoted by PU). Our main
objective is to ﬁnd out the information revelation policy which is most proﬁtable for B.9
In order to summarize, we consider a game with the following timing:
• Stage one: B chooses an information revelation policy.
• Stage two: Nature selects qualities (q1,q2) and costs (c1,c2); B observes (q1,q2), supplier i observes
ci, for i = 1,2.
• Stage three: B sends a message to each supplier, consistently with his choice at stage one.
• Stage four: Suppliers bid in the auction and B selects the winner.
In some cases our results are conveniently described by using the ratio σ/θ (as in the introduction) and
thus we deﬁne ω ≡ σ
θ.
3 Equilibrium under diﬀerent information policies
3.1 Concealment
Under the policy of concealment, no supplier receives any information about q1,q2. However, each supplier
(privately) observes her own cost before bidding, and therefore her bid is a function of the cost. Precisely,
we use piL,piH to denote the bid of supplier i if she has cost cL (i.e., if she is type L) and her bid if she
has cost cH (i.e., if she is type H), respectively.
As we mentioned in Section 2, given qualities (qi,qj) and bids (pi,pj), supplier i wins if qi−qj > pi−pj.
Therefore, in order to obtain an expression for the payoﬀ function of supplier i, it is useful to deﬁne the















θ2t for t ∈ [−θ,0]
1
θ − 1
θ2t for t ∈ (0,θ]
(1)
Now consider type k of supplier i, for k = L,H, and notice that bidding pik gives her a probability of
winning against type L of supplier j  = i equal to Pr{t < pjL − pik} = F(pjL − pik); the probability of
winning against type H of supplier j is Pr{t < pjH − pik} = F(pjH − pik). As a consequence, the payoﬀ
function of type k of supplier i is
(pik − ck)[λF(pjL − pik) + (1 − λ)F(pjH − pik)] for j  = i, k = L,H (2)
Since suppliers are ex ante symmetric, we focus on symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria (BNE in the
following), in which both type L of supplier 1 and type L of supplier 2 submit the same bid pL and both
type H of supplier 1 and type H of supplier 2 submit the same bid pH. We ﬁnd a (unique) pure-strategy
BNE if the diﬀerence σ between cH and cL is not too large, that is if σ < 1
λθ; in such a case pH −pL < θ,
which means that a supplier with type H wins with positive probability when her opponent has type L. If
instead σ ≥ 1
λθ, then we ﬁnd a pure-strategy BNE if (λ,σ) belongs to the set
C ≡
 


















9We suppose that q is suﬃciently large to make B’s payoﬀ positive under B’s most convenient policy.
10Since qi,qj are indentically distributed, the distribution of qj − qi is identical to the distribution of qi − qj.
5Moreover, for the special case in which λ = 1
2 and σ ∈ {5
2θ,3θ, 7
2θ} we described a mixed BNE. We discuss
this result after the proposition, in which we denote with UB
C the buyer’s expected payoﬀ in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Consider policy C.
(i) For the case in which σ < 1
λθ, there exists a unique symmetric BNE and is described as follows:
• If λ = 1
2, then







, pH = cH +
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96θ
2 (4θ − σ)
• If λ  = 1
2, then
pL = cL +
(1 + 2λ)∆2 − 2(2θ + λσ)∆ + 2θσ
2(1 − 2λ)∆
, pH = pL + ∆ (5)
UB
C = q − pL +
2
3
θ − (1 − λ)∆
3θ
2 − 3λ∆θ + λ∆2
3θ
2
in which ∆ is the unique solution in (0,θ) to the equation
4λ(1 − λ)∆3 − [3θ + 4λ(1 − λ)θ + 2λ(1 − λ)σ]∆2 + (5θ − 2λθ + 2σ)θ∆ − 2θ
2σ = 0 (6)
(ii) For the case in which (λ,σ) ∈ C there exists a symmetric BNE such that pH −pL ≥ θ and is described
as follows:















2 − 16λ + 11)θ − (1 − λ)2σ
(iii) If λ = 1
2 and σ ∈ {5
2θ,3θ, 7
2θ}, then there exists a symmetric mixed-strategy BNE which is characterized
by three bids pa
L,pb
L,pH and a probability µ ∈ (0,1) such that each type L bids pa
L with probability µ, bids
pb





L µ pH UB
C
5
2 cL + 1.51598θ cL + 2.08744θ 0.98747 cH + 0.4995θ q − cL − 1.30808θ
3 cL + 1.79273θ cL + 2.58746θ 0.84623 cH + 0.49355θ q − cL − 1.71114θ
7
2 cL + 2.12145θ cL + 3.07096θ 0.75271 cH + 0.49109θ q − cL − 2.15294θ
The setting studied by GGD is such that cH = cL, that is σ = 0, and they obtain pL = pH = cL + 1
2θ.
In order to compare the result of GGD with Proposition 1 it is useful to think of cL as ﬁxed while
cH = cL + σ > cL. Furthermore, in this discussion we focus on the case of λ = 1
2 since then equilibrium
bids have simple expressions.
From (4) it is straightforward to see that increasing σ increases the bid of both type L and type H; in
fact, it is intuitive that pH increases as σ increases, and moreover also pL increases since bids are strategic
complements. Furthermore, the suppliers’ ex ante expected payoﬀ increases with σ. From the viewpoint
of B, higher bids obviously reduce his payoﬀ and indeed UB
C is decreasing in σ. Regarding social surplus,
we notice that pH − pL = 1
2σ, which means that the diﬀerence between the bid of type H and the bid of
6type L is smaller than the cost diﬀerence.11 This generates an eﬃciency loss from a social point of view
since it is not always the case that the supplier with the highest value wins. Precisely, when c1 = cL and
c2 = cH (a symmetric argument applies when c1 = cH, c2 = cL) supplier 2 wins as long as q1,q2 satisfy
q2−pH > q1−pL, which reduces to q2 > q1+ 1
2σ, although 2 has the highest value if and only if q2 > q1+σ,
and the former condition is satisﬁed more often than the latter. Thus supplier 2 wins too often from a
social point of view.
On the other hand, it is intuitive that a suﬃciently large σ induces a large diﬀerence in bids such that
a type L always wins against a type H, that is pH − pL ≥ θ. In fact, this occurs if (λ,σ) belongs to the
set C deﬁned in (3) (in this case the equilibrium prices — in (7) — are simple enough that we do not need
to restrict to λ = 1
2), which requires that σ is larger than θ
λ, but not too larger. When (λ,σ) ∈ C and
c1 = cL, c2 = cH, for any (q1,q2) ∈ Q supplier 1 has a higher value than supplier 2 and the inequality
q1 − pL > q2 − pH holds for any q1,q2, which means that a supplier of type L certainly wins against a
supplier with type H; thus social surplus is maximized. However, we can prove the existence of a BNE
with this feature only if (λ,σ) ∈ C. In order to see why, consider type L and notice that (i) bidding pL
gives her a probability of winning equal to λ
2 +1−λ (she wins with probability 1
2 against type L, and with
probability 1 against type H); (ii) on the other hand, bidding pH −θ(> pL) yields a probability of winning
at least equal to 1 − λ (she still wins with probability 1 against type H); (iii) if σ is large and λ is small,
then pH −θ is signiﬁcantly larger than pL and the probability of winning has decreased only slightly; this
makes bidding pH − θ a proﬁtable deviation for type L.12
In addition, when λ is large we need that σ is suﬃciently larger than θ
λ because otherwise there exists
a proﬁtable deviation for type H which consists of bidding slightly above cH. Precisely, for a large λ the
equilibrium payoﬀ for a type H is small since he wins with positive probability only if his opponent has type
H (an event with probability 1−λ). If instead he bids below pL+θ, then he wins with positive probability
also if his opponent has type L, and moreover increases his probability of winning against type H. Such
a behavior is proﬁtable for type H if cH is suﬃciently lower than pL + θ; the inequality σ > (9
5 − 3
10λ)θ
guarantees that cH is large enough to make unproﬁtable the above described deviation. Finally, we notice
that the suppliers’ payoﬀs do not depend on σ if (λ,σ) ∈ C, thus an increase in σ in C has the only eﬀect
of reducing B’s payoﬀ.
When (λ,σ), an important feature of the BNE is that the suppliers’ rents are constant with respect to
σ: the payoﬀ of type L is (1
4λ+ 1
λ −1)θ and the payoﬀ of type H is 1−λ
4 θ. This occurs because pH −pL > θ
implies that (i) supplier 1L wins against 2H for any p1L close to pL, and thus pL does not depend on cH nor
on σ since small changes in the bid, such as those considered by the ﬁrst order condition, do not aﬀect the
probability for 1L to win against 2H; (ii) type 1H eﬀectively competes only against type 2H, and thus cH
has an additive eﬀect on pH but does not aﬀect the mark-up. Therefore suppliers’ rents are independent
of σ for (λ,σ) ∈ C, and even though the suppliers’ private informations on costs become more signiﬁcant,
under policy C the suppliers are unable to increase their rents. As we will see, this is not the case for the
other information policies.
For a large σ, no symmetric pure strategy BNE exists, but a mixed strategy BNE exists since for each
type ik of supplier, as the payoﬀ function in (2) is continuous in bids. However, characterizing such a BNE
is not straightforward, and in Proposition 1(ii) we describe a mixed strategy BNE for λ = 1
2 and a few
11This results holds because (pik − ck)[λF(pL −p)+ (1 −λ)F(pH − p)] (the demand function for the product of a supplier
choosing price p) is log-concave in p, as we show in the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix.
12Obviously, the ﬁrst order conditions which deliver the prices in (7) fail to take into account this (non-local) deviation by
type L. Notice also that we are considering the speciﬁc deviation in which type L bids pH − θ only to ﬁx the ideas, but it is
conceivable that there exist even more proﬁtable deviations for type L.
7values of σ. In such a BNE each type H bids slightly less than cH + 1
2θ, whereas each type L randomizes
between two bids pa
L,pb
L which are both larger than cL + 3
2θ. This makes the proﬁt of each type L larger
than when 1L and 2L play the pure strategy cL + 3
2θ, and in particular pb
L is relatively close to pH − θ,
which implies that type L obtains in equilibrium the payoﬀ from bidding close to pH − θ. Notice that in
this BNE the winner may be selected ineﬃciently, since a type Lloses with a positive probability against
a type H.
3.2 Private revelation
Under the policy of private revelation, B privately (and truthfully) reveals qi to supplier i, for i = 1,2, that
is before the auction is held. A strategy for supplier i is thus a function Pi which associates a bid to each
pair (ci,qi) ∈ {cL,cH}×[q, ¯ q]. Since suppliers are ex ante symmetric, we focus on symmetric BNE in which
the function P1 is identical to P2, denoted with P. Precisely, a symmetric BNE in which all suppliers bid
according to a function P is such that
for any ci ∈ {cL,cH} and any qi ∈ [q, ¯ q],
(pi − ci)Pr{qi − pi > qj − P(cj,qj) for j  = i}
is maximized with respect to pi at pi = P(ci,qi)
(8)
This setting with bidimensional private information turns out to be closely linked to a ”standard
auction” environment in which (i) an object is sold through a ﬁrst price auction with two bidders; (ii) vi
is the valuation (privately observed) of bidder i for i = 1,2; (iii) (v1,v2) are i.i.d., each with c.d.f. G. In
such a setting a symmetric BNE is characterized by a bidding function β such that each bidder with type
vi bids β(vi), and it is well known that a unique symmetric BNE exists [see for instance Monteiro (2009)].
Proposition 2 below relies on this result to ﬁnd the unique symmetric BNE under the PR policy and
the key idea is quite simple. In (8), replace ci using vi = qi − ci and then employ si = qi − pi, the score,
as the choice variable of supplier i. Then the problem
max
pi
(pi − ci)Pr{qi − pi > qj − P(cj,qj) for j  = i} (9)
can be written as
max
si
(vi − si)Pr{si > qj − P(cj,qj) for j  = i} (10)
The formulation in (10) is useful since it is the decision problem of a bidder with valuation vi in a standard
auction, in which qj −P(cj,qj) is the bid of her opponent. Moreover, (10) reveals that the score si oﬀered
by supplier i depends only on vi, and not on qi and ci separately.
Proposition 2 Consider policy PR, and let G denote the common c.d.f. of v1 and v2. Then the unique
symmetric BNE is such that





dy for any ci,qi (11)
The supplier with the highest value wins and the buyer’s expected payoﬀ UB
PR is E[min{v1,v2}], the expected
second highest valuation.
We notice that (an analogous formulation of) Proposition 2 holds under much more general assumptions:
we can allow for any number of suppliers and for any (i.i.d.) distributions of qualities and costs. We restrict
to the particular setting described in Section 2 in order to compare PR with the other information policies.
8The c.d.f. G of v1 and v2 is simple to derive, but we need to distinguish two cases. If σ > θ, that is if
ω > 1, then the value of a supplier with cost cL is certainly larger than the value of a supplier with cost







θ if v ∈ [q − cH, ¯ q − cH]
1 − λ if v ∈ (¯ q − cH,q − cL]
1 − λ + λ
v+cL−q
θ if v ∈ (q − cL, ¯ q − cL]
such that G is constant for values between ¯ q − cH and q − cL. In the opposite case of ω ≤ 1, the set of












θ if v ∈ (q − cL, ¯ q − cH]
1 − λ + λ
v+cL−q
θ if v ∈ (¯ q − cH, ¯ q − cL]
Given G, it is straightforward to evaluate E[min{v1,v2}]; we describe the results in next Corollary.
Corollary 1 Under policy PR,
(i) when ω ≤ 1 the buyer’s payoﬀ UB
PR is equal to q − cL + 1
3[1 − (1 − λ)(3 + 3λω − λω2)ω]θ and the
suppliers’ rents US
PR are 1
3[1 + 2λ(1 − λ)ω2(3 − ω)]θ;
(ii) when ω > 1 the buyer’s payoﬀ is q − cL + 1
3[1 + λ − λ
2 − 3(1 − λ
2)ω]θ and the suppliers’ rents are
[1
3(1 − 2λ + 2λ
2) + 2λ(1 − λ)ω]θ.
It is simple to see that an increase in ω above zero is harmful for B since it reduces (increases) the
probability of high (low) values. More formally, the c.d.f. for each supplier’s value when ω > 0 is ﬁrst order
stochastically dominated by the c.d.f. when ω = 0 and E[min{v1,v2}] is decreasing in ω. Conversely, as in
C, an increase in ω increases the suppliers’ ex ante expected rents.
3.3 Public revelation
Under the policy of Public revelation the buyer truthfully and publicly reveals the suppliers’ qualities q1,q2
before the auction is held. Thus q1,q2 become commonly known, and without loss of generality we suppose
that q2 ≥ q1 and use t ≥ 0 to denote the diﬀerence q2 − q1. Since each supplier privately observes the
own cost, we use piL,piH to denote the bid of supplier i if she has cost cL, and her bid if she has cost
cH, respectively. This is the same notation employed for policy C, but notice that under PU the common
knowledge of q1,q2 generically puts the suppliers on an asymmetric footing since q1  = q2 except in a zero-
measure set. We use 1L and 1H to denote the type of supplier 1 with cost cL and the type with cost cH,
respectively; likewise, we use 2L, 2H to denote the two types of supplier 2.
In fact, this game is equivalent to a standard ﬁrst price auction like the one described in Subsection 3.2,
except that bidders have asymmetrically (and independently) distributed valuations such that the set of
possible values for bidder 1 is {q1−cH,q1−cL}, the set of possible values for bidder 2 is {q2−cH,q2−cL},
and Pr{v1 = q1 − cL} = Pr{v2 = q2 − cL} = λ. We study this setting in Doni and Menicucci (2011), and
indeed our Proposition 3, in which we describe the unique equilibrium outcome,14 follows from Proposition
1 in Doni and Menicucci (2011).
13In case that ω = 1, the middle interval collapses to one point.
14Multiple BNE exists because type 1H (and type 1L in one case) never wins in equilibrium, but equilibrium conditions
require that she bids above cH (above cL) with probability one, and in a way that no type of supplier 2 has incentive to bid
above t + cH (above t + cL). Since there are many strategies of 1H (of 1L) which achieve this goal, multiple BNE exist, but
this is not an issue since each BNE generates the same outcome in the sense that the winner and the payoﬀ of each type of
supplier and of B are the same across diﬀerent BNE.
9Notice that in Proposition 3(ii) an important role is played by two speciﬁc bids ˜ p and ˆ p, such that ˜ p is
the larger solution to the equation
(1 − λ)p2 − [(1 − 2λ)t + (1 − λ)(cH + cL)]p + (1 − λ)(t + cH)cL − λtcH = 0 (12)
and ˆ p ≡ (1 − λ)˜ p + λ(t + cL). Precisely, satisfying (12) guarantees that the c.d.f. for the mixed strategy
of supplier 1L is continuous at p = ˜ p − t. Furthermore, ˆ p is such that the c.d.f. for the mixed strategy of
supplier 2L has value 0 at p = ˆ p. In the proof of Proposition 3(ii) we show that ˜ p satisﬁes max{t+cL,cH} <
˜ p < t + cH, and therefore t + cL < ˜ p < t + cL + (1 − λ)σ.
Proposition 3 Consider policy PU and suppose that B has revealed qualities q1,q2, with t ≡ q2 − q1 > 0.
Then multiple BNE exist, but they all generate the same outcome as the following BNE.
Type 1H bids more than cH with probability one and in such a way that no type of supplier 2 has incentive
to bid above t + cH; the bids of the other types depend on the parameters as follows.
(i) If λt ≥ σ, then types 2L and 2H bid t + cL; type 1L bids more than cL with probability one and in
such a way that no type of supplier 2 has incentive to bid above t + cL.
(ii) If λt < σ, then types 1L,2L,2H play mixed strategies with support [ˆ p − t,cH) for 1L, [ˆ p, ˜ p] for 2L,
[˜ p,t + cH] for 2H, in which ˜ p is the larger solution to (12) and ˆ p ≡ (1 − λ)˜ p + λ(t + cL). The c.d.f. Φ1L,












˜ p − p2L
p2L − cL − t
for p2L ∈ [ˆ p, ˜ p], Φ2H(p2H) =
 
p2H−˜ p
p2H−cL−t for p2H ∈ [˜ p,t + cH)
1 for p2H = t + cH
and are such that Φ1L is continuous at p1L = ˜ p − t and Φ2L(ˆ p) = 0.
When λt ≥ σ, Proposition 3(i) establishes that each type of supplier 2 bids t+cL and wins against each
type of supplier 1,15 a quite intuitive result since a large t gives a large advantage to supplier 2 with respect
to the diﬀerences in costs which may be determined by the suppliers’ private signals. More in detail, (i)
1L (1H) will not oﬀer to B a score higher than q1 −cL (higher than q1 −cH); (ii) a bid of t+cL of supplier
2 is equivalent to oﬀering a score of q2 −(t+cL) = q1 −cL, thus supplier 2 certainly wins if she bids t+cL
(or perhaps slightly less); (iii) if q2 is suﬃciently larger than q1 (i.e., if t is suﬃciently large), then both 2L
and 2H is willing to bid t + cL in order to earn t (for 2L) or t − σ (for 2H). Precisely, when λt ≥ σ type
2H prefers winning for sure by bidding t + cL rather than bidding t + cH and winning only against type
1H, that is with probability 1 − λ.
On the other hand, if σ is large with respect to t (that is, if the advantage of 2 is small), then λt < σ
holds and 2H is less aggressive since she prefers to bid t + cH and win only against type 1H rather than
bidding t +cL and winning with certainty, as the latter alternative yields a low proﬁt margin. Indeed, 2H
bids in the interval [˜ p,t + cH], with ˜ p > t + cL (and with an atom at t + cH), which means that she oﬀers
a score in [q1 − cH,q2 − ˜ p]. The less aggressive bidding of 2H allows 1L to win with positive probability
by bidding somewhat above cL, and indeed the support for the equilibrium bids of 1L is [ˆ p − t,cH) with
ˆ p − t > cL, which corresponds to a score in (q1 − cH,q2 − ˆ p]. As a consequence, also the lowest bid of
2L is larger than t + cL, as we see from Proposition 3(ii). Precisely, 2L bids in the interval [ˆ p, ˜ p], which
corresponds to a score in [q2 − ˜ p,q2 − ˆ p]. Therefore, a large cost diﬀerence with respect to t generates a
15In a related setting, Maskin and Riley (2000) identify an analogous BNE and provide the intuition we describe here.
10less aggressive behavior of all suppliers, compared to the case of a small value of σ, because 2H is less
aggressive and this induces also the other suppliers to be less aggressive.
Notice that, when λt < σ, the highest valuation supplier does not always win. Precisely, let Pr{1L def
2L} and Pr{1L def 2H} denote the probability that 1L wins against 2L and the probability that 1L wins
against 2H, respectively. Since 1L oﬀers a score in (q1 −cH,q2 − ˆ p], 2L oﬀers a score in [q2 − ˜ p,q2 − ˆ p], and
2H oﬀers a score in [q1 − cH,q2 − ˜ p], it follows that Pr{1L def 2L} > 0 even though q2 − cL > q1 −cL and
Pr{1L def 2H} ∈ (0,1) even though q2 − cH  = q1 − cL.16
In next corollary we use uB
PU(q1,q2) to denote B’s equilibrium payoﬀ given q1,q2. From Proposition
3(i) it follows that uB
PU(q1,q2) = q1 − cL when λt ≥ σ, whereas if λt < σ we can evaluate uB
PU(q1,q2) as
the diﬀerence between the social surplus (the expected value of the winner) and the suppliers’ payoﬀ.






q1 − cL if λt ≥ σ
q1 − cL + λ(2 − λ)t − (1 − λ
2)σ − λ
 
[t + (1 − λ)σ]2 − 4λ(1 − λ)t2
−λ
2tPr{1L def 2L} + λ(1 − λ)(σ − t)Pr{1L def 2H}
if λt < σ
In the setting of GGD with σ = 0, given q2 > q1, supplier 2 wins by bidding t + cL and uB
PU(q1,q2) =
q1 − cL. As σ increases above 0, B’s payoﬀ is still q1 − cL as long as the inequality λt ≥ σ is satisﬁed, but
if λt < σ then Proposition 3(ii) applies and each supplier oﬀers a score between q1 −cH and q2 − ˆ p. Since
ˆ p > t + cL, it follows that q1 − cH < uB
PU(q1,q2) < q1 −cL. Therefore a positive σ reduces B’s payoﬀ only
in the states of the world such that λt < σ. As we have explained above, a σ satisfying λt ≤ σ induces 2H
to bid higher [i.e., less aggressively] than t + cL, which in turn elicits less aggressive bidding also from 1L
and 2L; this reduces B’s payoﬀ.
After the buyer’s payoﬀ uB
PU(q1,q2) is obtained for any q1,q2, we can derive B’s ex ante expected
payoﬀ UB
PU as Eq1,q2[uB
PU(q1,q2)]. However, given that Pr{1L def 2L} and Pr{1L def 2H} have complicated
expressions, also UB
PU has a complicated expression. Nevertheless, in next section we show that in some
cases it is possible to compare UB
PU with UB
PR without resorting to numerical methods.
4 The optimal information policy
In this section we compare the three information revelation policies from the point of view of B.
4.1 Comparison between PR and C
Proposition 4 (i) If σ ≤ θ, then UB
PR > UB
C for any λ ∈ (0,1).
(ii) If (λ,σ) ∈ C and σ > 2λ2−14λ+13





C when σ = 0, Proposition 4(i) can be interpreted as an extension of the result
obtained by GGD. On the other hand, when σ > 2λ2−14λ+13
12λ(1−λ) θ and (λ,σ) ∈ C we ﬁnd that UB
C > UB
PR, and
a simple intuition applies to this result. In Subsections 3.1 we have seen that under C a large σ separates
type L from type H in the sense that type L always wins against type H. This implies that the winner is
always the supplier with the highest valuation, and therefore C and PR generate the same social surplus.
Thus the buyer’s preferences between C and PR are determined by the suppliers’ payoﬀs under the two
policies, US
C and US
PR. In this respect, we have noticed in Subsection 3.1 that US
C is constant with respect
16The precise values of Pr{1L def 2L} and Pr{1L def 2H} are obtained in the proof of Proposition 3.
11to σ if (λ,σ) ∈ C, and from Corollary 1(ii) it follows that US
PR is increasing in σ. This suggests that C is
superior to PR for a large σ because is more eﬀective at controlling the suppliers’ rents.
4.2 Comparison between PR and PU
In Subsection 3.3 (Corollary 2) we have obtained the buyer’s payoﬀ under PU for given values of q1,q2
such that q2 ≥ q1, uB
PU(q1,q2), and noticed that B’s ex ante payoﬀ UB
PU is equal to Eq1,q2[uB
PU(q1,q2)].
In order to compare PU with PR, we recall that B’s payoﬀ under PR is given by the expected second
highest value: UB
PR = Ev1,v2[min{v1,v2}] = Eq1,c1,q2,c2[min{q1 −c1,q2 −c2}], and we deﬁne uB
PR(q1,q2) as
Ec1,c2[min{q1−c1,q2−c2}|q1,q2] in order to satisfy UB
PR = Eq1,q2[uB
PR(q1,q2)]. Thus UB
PR can be obtained
by ﬁrst evaluating uB
PR(q1,q2) for each q1,q2, and then taking the expectation of uB
PR(q1,q2) with respect
to q1,q2. Since UB
PU = Eq1,q2[uB
PU(q1,q2)], this suggests that comparing uB
PR(q1,q2) with uB
PU(q1,q2) for
diﬀerent (q1,q2) may give some insights about the comparison between UB
PR and UB
PU.
To this purpose it is useful to recall our earlier remark that the ﬁrst score auction under PU is equiv-
alent to a standard ﬁrst price auction (FPA henceforth) in which the set of possible values for bidder
1 is {q1 − cH,q1 − cL}, the set of possible values for bidder 2 is {q2 − cH,q2 − cL}, and v1,v2 are in-
dependently distributed with Pr{v1 = q1 − cL} = Pr{v2 = q2 − cL} = λ. Conversely, for PR we have
uB
PR(q1,q2) = Ec1,c2[min{q1 − c1,q2 − c2}|q1,q2], which is a seller’s expected revenue in a second price
auction (SPA henceforth) given the same information environment described just above. Therefore, com-
paring uB
PR(q1,q2) with uB
PU(q1,q2) leads us to the long standing problem in auction theory of comparing
the seller’s expected revenue in the FPA with the expected revenue in the SPA when the bidders’ values
are asymmetrically distributed.
In particular, in our environment the asymmetry is generated by a distribution shift with size q2−q1. The
literature on asymmetric auctions has studied a related setting: Maskin and Riley (2000) and Kirkegaard
(2011) prove that with continuously distributed valuations (and some regularity conditions) the FPA is
superior to the SPA. However, we consider a model with discretely distributed valuations, and the above
results do not necessarily apply. In particular, we obtain an opposite result in the case of a small shift.
In order to compare uB
PU(q1,q2) with uB
PR(q1,q2), it is useful to deﬁne three subsets of Q = [q, ¯ q]×[q, ¯ q],
which we denote Q1,Q2,Q3:
Q1 ≡ {(q1,q2) ∈ Q : q1 ≤ q2 < q1 + σ}








Clearly, Q3 is empty if σ
λ > θ and Q2 is empty if σ > θ. Figure 1 represents graphically Q1,Q2,Q3
Insert ﬁgure 1 here
The buyer’s payoﬀ depends as follows on the set in which (q1,q2) is located.
• Under PU, if (q1,q2) ∈ Q3 then Proposition 3(i) applies and uB
PU(q1,q2) = q1 − cL. Conversely,
Proposition 3(ii) applies if (q1,q2) ∈ Q1 ∪ Q2 and then q1 − cH < uB
PU(q1,q2) < q1 − cL.
• Under PR, for each (q1,q2) ∈ Q2 ∪Q3 we have q2 −q1 ≥ σ, thus q1 −c1 < q2 −c2. This implies that
uB
PR(q1,q2) = Ec1,c2[min{q1 − c1,q2 − c2}|q1,q2] = Ec1(q1 − c1|q1) = q1 − cL − (1 − λ)σ. Conversely,
for (q1,q2) ∈ Q1 we ﬁnd uB
PR(q1,q2) = λ
2(q1−cL)+λ(1−λ)(q1+t−cL−σ)+λ(1−λ)(q1−cL−σ)+
(1−λ)2(q1 −cL −σ) = q1 −cL −(1−λ)σ−λ(1−λ)(σ−t), which is smaller than q1 −cL −(1−λ)σ.
12Next proposition relies on the above arguments to compare UB
PR with UB
PU, and we remark that it does
not use the assumption that (q1,q2) are uniformly distributed.
Proposition 5 Suppose that q1,q2 are i.i.d. with common support [q, ¯ q]. Then
(i) UB
PU > UB
PR when σ > 0 is about zero;
(ii) UB
PR > UB




The basic idea for Proposition 5(i) is quite simple. When σ > 0 is small, Pr{(q1,q2) ∈ Q1 ∪ Q2}
is about 0, which suggests that the comparison between PU and PR is determined by the comparison
between uB
PU(q1,q2) and uB
PR(q1,q2) for (q1,q2) ∈ Q3. Then (i) under PU each type of supplier 2 oﬀers a
score q1 − cL in order to win against both types of supplier 1; (ii) under PR the second highest value is
v1 = q1 −c1, which in expectation is equal to q1 −cL −(1 −λ)σ, smaller than q1 −cL. This is the "Getty
eﬀect" described by Maskin and Riley (2000), which applies when the size of the shift is large relative to
σ. Although this argument may appear suﬃcient to establish UB
PU > UB
PR, it is necessary to notice that
uB
PU(q1,q2) − uB
PR(q1,q2) = (1 − λ)σ when (q1,q2) ∈ Q3, and thus the advantage of PU over PR is small
when σ is small. However, in the proof of Proposition 5(i) we show that PR cannot be much better than
PU in Q1 ∪Q2, as uB
PU(q1,q2)−uB
PR(q1,q2) > −λσ for any (q1,q2) ∈ Q1 ∪Q2, and then the property that
Pr{(q1,q2) ∈ Q1 ∪ Q2} is close to 0 for σ close to zero yields UB
PU > UB
PR.
Proposition 5(ii) relies on a diﬀerent argument. First notice that max{
3(1+λ)
2(3−λ), 3λ−1
2(1−λ)} > λ, thus Q3 is
empty when σ ≥ max{
3(1+λ)
2(3−λ), 3λ−1
2(1−λ)}θ, and any feasible (q1,q2) (such that q2 ≥ q1) belongs to Q1 ∪ Q2,
which makes Proposition 3(ii) apply. Then we show that for any (q1,q2) ∈ Q1∪Q2, the suppliers’ aggregate
rents are lower under PR than under PU given σ ≥ max{
3(1+λ)
2(3−λ), 3λ−1
2(1−λ)}θ. Moreover, we know from
Proposition 2 that social surplus is maximized under PR since the higher value supplier always wins under
PR. Conversely, under PU social surplus is not maximized as the lowest valuation supplier may win with
positive probability. Therefore it follows that UB
PR > UB




In fact, there is another interesting way of seeing this result, which relies on inquiring how a small
shift q2 − q1 > 0 aﬀects the suppliers’ bids with respect to the case of q2 = q1. We ﬁnd that type 1L
bids less aggressively while the bidding of types 2L and 2H in terms of score is unchanged (up to a second
order eﬀect). This has the consequence that the buyer’s payoﬀ under PU decreases as a consequence
of the shift, that is uB
PU(q1,q2) < uB
PU(q1,q1) [see Doni and Menicucci (2011) for more details on this
result]. On the other hand, the buyer’s payoﬀ under PR is the expected second highest valuation, and thus
uB
PR(q1,q2) > uB
PR(q1,q1), which suggests that PR is superior to PU for a small shift, or equivalently for a
large σ/θ.
The main message of Proposition 5 is as follows. When σ > 0 is small, revealing q1,q2 typically puts
the bidders in a very asymmetric setting such that λt ≥ σ is satisﬁed, and then the supplier with the
highest quality bids aggressively in order to win against each type of the other supplier. This makes PU
superior to PR. When instead σ is large such that λt < σ holds in any case (i.e., for any t), no supplier has
a suﬃciently large advantage to bid aggressively in PU (in fact, a modest asymmetry reduces the buyer’s
payoﬀ under PU), and then we ﬁnd PR is better.
4.3 General ranking
By using Propositions 4 and 5 we obtain next Proposition. It does not cover all parameter values, but
shows that for each ﬁxed policy there is a set of parameter values for which the given policy is optimal.




σ ≤ θ;C if (λ,σ) ∈ C and σ ≥ max{2λ2−14λ+13
12λ(1−λ) , 3λ−1
2(1−λ)}θ.
(ii) For the special case in which λ = 1
2, there exists ω∗ ≃ 0.3949 such that the best information
revelation policy is PU if ω < ω∗, is PR if ω∗ < ω < 13
6 , is C if ω ∈ (13
6 ,2
√
3 − 1] ∪ {5
2,3, 7
2}.




C . Proposition 6(ii) establishes that these results are not robust to allowing ω > 0: UB
PU  = UB
PR
for any ω  = ω∗, and C is the best policy for large values of ω. More generally, Proposition 6(ii) implies that
the amount of information B should release is decreasing with respect to ω. Precisely, revealing q1 and q2
is the best policy for B when each supplier’s private information on costs is scarcely signiﬁcant (since cL
is relatively close to cH when ω is small), but private revelation is optimal when ω takes on intermediate
values, and no revelation at all is optimal when ω is large, that is when suppliers’ private information is
very signiﬁcant with respect to quality diﬀerences. As we have seen in the previous subsections, PU is
optimal for ω ≃ 0 as it elicits aggressive bidding from the supplier with higher quality, whereas C is optimal
for a large ω since it is good at controlling rents.
5 Conclusions
In some procurement settings a product’s perceived quality depends on the buyer’s subjective needs or
tastes. In these cases buyers have to choose how much of their information to reveal to suppliers before
the bidding occurs. In this paper we have studied the outcomes of diﬀerent information revelation policies
in a procurement auction. GGD have already delved into this issue, under the assumption that suppliers
have identical, commonly known costs. We introduce uncertainty in each suppliers’ cost, and therefore
suppliers can be heterogeneous both because of the qualities of their products and because of their costs.
Under uniformly distributed qualities, our main ﬁnding is (Proposition 6) that the amount of information
the buyer should reveal is decreasing in the degree of uncertainty on suppliers’ costs with respect to the
degree of uncertainty on supplier’s qualities. In order to derive this result we compared the revenue in a
FPA with the revenue in a SPA in an asymmetric setting with a distribution shift, and we have proved
that some known results for asymmetric auctions with continuos valuations do not hold in an environment
with discretely distributed types.
Future research could extend our analysis along several directions. For instance, we could allow for
an endogenous number of suppliers, which requires to analyze how the information policy aﬀects each
supplier’s entry incentives. Another extension would allow for vertically diﬀerentiated products. Precisely,
sometimes the qualities of two diﬀerent products can be unambiguously ranked, and the uncertainty is
only about the buyer’s willingness to pay for the higher quality product rather than for the lower quality
one. This suggests the question of how diﬀerent information policies aﬀect a supplier’s incentives to invest
in improving the quality of the own product when vertical diﬀerentiation is endogenous. Finally, the
evaluation of a procurement policy should take into account its vulnerability to corruption and collusion
[see Katok and Wambach (2008)]. Therefore, it would be useful to have an analysis of pros and cons of
diﬀerent procurement policies when qualitative evaluations are expressed by public oﬃcials who can pursue
their private interest, or when suppliers can create a cartel.
146 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Without loss of generality, we consider supplier 1. Given the bids pL,pH of the two types of supplier 2, the
payoﬀ of type L of supplier 1 is (p1L−cL)[λF(pL−p1L)+(1−λ)F(pH −p1L)], and the payoﬀ of type H of
supplier 1 is (p1H −cH)[λF(pL −p1H)+(1−λ)F(pH −p1H)]. In equilibrium these payoﬀs are maximized
at p1L = pL and at p1H = pH, respectively. The associated ﬁrst order conditions are written as follows,
with ∆ = pH − pL (clearly, ∆ ≥ 0 since cH > cL):17
λF(0) + (1 − λ)F(∆) = (pL − cL)[λf(0) + (1 − λ)f(∆)] (13)
λF(−∆) + (1 − λ)F(0) = (pH − cH)[λf(−∆) + (1 − λ)f(0)] (14)
As it is intuitive, we need to distinguish the case in which ∆ ≤ θ from the case in which ∆ > θ, since
F(−∆) = 0, F(∆) = 1 and f(−∆) = f(∆) = 0 when ∆ > θ, whereas 0 < F(−∆) < F(∆) < 1 and
f(−∆) = f(∆) > 0 when ∆ < θ.
6.1.1 The case in which ∆ < θ
Step 1 Derivation of equilibrium bids and the payoﬀ of the buyer When ∆ ≤ θ, using (1) we
can write (13) and (14) as follows:
1
2
θ + (1 − λ)∆(1 −
∆
2θ






θ − λ∆(1 −
∆
2θ




and taking the diﬀerence between (15) and (16) yields
1
2
∆(2θ − ∆) = (θ − ∆ + λ∆)(σ − ∆) + (pH − cH)(2λ − 1)∆ (17)
If λ = 1
2, then (17) has solutions ∆ = 1
2σ and ∆ = 2θ. The second solution violates ∆ ≤ θ, whereas
inserting ∆ = 1
2σ in (15)-(16) we obtain (4).
If λ  = 1
2, then from (17) we obtain pH = cH +
(3−2λ)∆2−2(2θ+(1−λ)σ)∆+2θσ
2(1−2λ)∆ and pH − ∆ is equal to
pL in (5). Inserting the expression for pH into (16) yields (6), in which ∆ is the unique unknown; we are
interested in the solutions of (6) which belong to [0,θ]. It is useful to divide the left hand side in (6) by
θ
3, with x ≡ ∆
θ , ω ≡ σ
θ, and then (6) is written as
4λ(1 − λ)x3 − (3 + 4λ(1 − λ) + 2λ(1 − λ)ω)x2 + (5 − 2λ + 2ω)x − 2ω = 0 (18)
There exists a ∆ ∈ [0,θ] which solves (6) if and only if there exists x ∈ [0,1] which solves (18). We
use Ψ(x) to denote the left hand side of (18) and notice that Ψ(0) = −2ω < 0, Ψ(1) = 2(1 − λ)(1 − λω);
thus there exists a solution in (0,1] as long as ω ≤ 1
λ, which is equivalent to λσ ≤ θ. Moreover, Ψ′′(x) =
24λ(1 − λ)x − 2(3 + 4λ(1 − λ) + 2λ(1 − λ)ω) is negative for any x ∈ (0,1), thus Ψ is strictly concave in
[0,1] and the solution to (18) in (0,1] is unique for ω < 1
λ. Precisely, let x∗ denote the smallest solution to
(18) in (0,1) and notice that the strict concavity of Ψ and Ψ(1) > 0 imply Ψ(x) > 0 for each x ∈ (x∗,1].
Hence, (6) has a unique solution in (0,θ] if λσ < θ.
17Notice that the payoﬀ functions are continuously diﬀerentiable in prices.
15Given the equilibrium prices in (4)-(5), we ﬁnd that the payoﬀ of the buyer is
UB
C = λ


















= q − pL +
2
3
θ − (1 − λ)∆
3θ
2 − 3λ∆θ + λ∆2
3θ
2
Step 2 Proof that pL,pH in (3) constitute a BNE if λσ < θ Clearly, merely satisfying the ﬁrst order
conditions does not guarantee that a BNE is obtained. In order to verify that this is the case, consider the
function R(y) ≡
λf(y)+(1−λ)f(∆+y)
λF(y)+(1−λ)F(∆+y) deﬁned for y ∈ (−θ − ∆,θ]. If R is monotone decreasing in y, then it
is straightforward to prove that pL,pH in (3) constitute a BNE. Next lemma establishes that R is strictly
decreasing when λ ≤ 1
2, but not necessarily when λ > 1
2.
Step 2.1 The function R(y) =
λf(y)+(1−λ)f(∆+y)
λF(y)+(1−λ)F(∆+y) is strictly decreasing in y in the interval (−θ −
∆,θ] if λ ≤ 1
2; if λ > 1
2, then R is strictly decreasing in the interval [−∆,θ] We start by exploiting
(1) to derive an expression for R(y):
R(y) =

        
        
2
θ+∆+y for y ∈ (−θ − ∆,−θ]
2(θ+∆+y−λ∆)
y2+2(∆+θ−λ∆)y+θ2+2θ∆−2λθ∆+∆2−λ∆2 for y ∈ (−θ,−∆]
2[(2λ−1)y+λ∆+θ−∆]
(2λ−1)y2+2(θ−∆+λ∆)y−∆2+θ2+2θ∆−2λθ∆+λ∆2 for y ∈ (−∆,0]
2(θ−∆−y+λ∆)
−y2+2(θ−∆+λ∆)y+θ2+2θ∆−2λθ∆−∆2+λ∆2 for y ∈ (0,θ − ∆]
2λ(y−θ)
λθ2−2λθy+λy2−2θ2 for y ∈ (θ − ∆,θ]
• For y ∈ (−θ − ∆,−θ] it is straightforward that R is decreasing in y.
• For y ∈ (−θ,−∆], R′(y) has the same sign as ρ1(y) ≡ −y2 − 2(∆ + θ − λ∆)y − θ
2 − 2(1 − λ)∆θ +
(2λ − 1)(1 − λ)∆2, which is decreasing in y and ρ1(−θ) = −(1 − 2λ)(1 − λ)∆2 ≤ 0 for λ ≤ 1
2.
• For y ∈ (−∆,0], R′(y) has the same sign as
ρ2(y) ≡ −(2λ − 1)
2 y2 − 2(2λ − 1)(θ − ∆ + λ∆)y − (3 − 2λ)θ
2 + 2(2λ + 1)(1 − λ)∆θ − (1 − λ)∆2
Case of λ ≤ 1
2. Then ρ2 is increasing and ρ2(0) = −(3 − 2λ)θ
2 + 2(2λ + 1)(1 − λ)∆θ − (1 − λ)∆2,
which is decreasing in θ. Hence, from θ > ∆ we see that ρ2(0) is smaller than −(3 − 2λ)∆2 +
2(2λ + 1)(1 − λ)∆2 − (1 − λ)∆2 = −(2 − 5λ + 4λ
2)∆2 < 0.
Case of λ > 1
2. Then ρ2 is decreasing and ρ2(−∆) = −(3 − 2λ)θ
2 + 2λ(3 − 2λ)∆θ − λ∆2, which is
decreasing in θ. Hence, from θ > ∆ we see that ρ2(−∆) < −(3 − 2λ)∆2 + 2λ(3 − 2λ)∆2 − λ∆2 =
(4λ − 3)(1 − λ)∆2, which is negative or zero for λ ≤ 3
4. For λ > 3











2−90λ+9) is non negative
for each ω ∈ [0, 1







• For y ∈ (0,θ −∆], R′(y) has the same sign as ρ3(y) ≡ −y2 +2(θ − ∆ + λ∆)y −3θ
2 +2(1 −λ)∆θ +





• For y ∈ (θ − ∆,θ], R′(y) has the same sign as ρ4(y) ≡ −λy2 + 2λθy − λθ
2 −2θ
2, which is increasing
in y and ρ4(θ) = −2θ
2 < 0.
16Step 2.2 If type L and type H of supplier 2 play pL and pH in (3), respectively, then playing
pH is a best reply for type H of supplier 1 As we have speciﬁed above, the payoﬀ function of type
H is πH(p1H) = (p1H − cH)[λF(pL − p1H) + (1 − λ)F(pH − p1H)], and
π′
H(p1H) = [λf(pL − p1H) + (1 − λ)f(pH − p1H)][
λF(pL − p1H) + (1 − λ)F(pH − p1H)
λf(pL − p1H) + (1 − λ)f(pH − p1H)
− p1H + cH]
We know that π′
H(pH) = 0 and Step 2.1 reveals that if λ ≤ 1
2, then the second factor in π′
H(p1H) is strictly
decreasing in p1H — interpret pL − p1H as y — for p1H ∈ [pL − θ,pH + θ). Thereforeπ′
H(pH) = 0 implies
that π′
H(p1H) > 0 for p1H ∈ [pL − θ,pH) and π′
H(p1H) < 0 for p1H ∈ (pH,pH + θ). If instead λ > 1
2, then
the second factor in π′









(pL − p1H +
1
2θ
(pL − p1H)2) +
1 − λ
θ
(pH − p1H +
1
2θ












H is convex and π′
H(pH) = 0, the inequality π′
H(p1H) ≤ 0 holds for each p1H ∈ (pH,pL + θ] if and
only if π′
H(pL + θ) ≤ 0. We ﬁnd that π′
H(pL + θ) = 1−λ
2λ−1[2λˆ x2 − (1 − λω + ω + 2λ)ˆ x + ω], where ˆ x is the
unique solution to Ψ(x) = 0in (0,1) [see (18)].
Step 2.2.1 For ω < 1, the inequality π′
H(pL + θ) ≤ 0 is satisﬁed First we prove that 1
2ω < ˆ x < 3
4ω,
given λ > 1
2 and ω < 1, by verifying that Ψ(1
2ω) < 0 < Ψ(3
4ω). Precisely, we ﬁnd that Ψ(1
2ω) =
1





9ω2 − 36ω − 24
 
λ + 28 − 3ω). Let
ξω(λ) = 9ω(4 − ω)λ
2+
 
9ω2 − 36ω − 24
 
λ+28−3ω. For ω ≤ 2− 2
3
√
3, we ﬁnd that ξω is maximized with
respect to λ ∈ (1
2,1] at λ = 1and ξω(1) = 9ω(4 − ω)+
 
9ω2 − 36ω − 24
 




3,1], we ﬁnd that ξω is maximized with respect to λ ∈ (1
2,1] at λ = 8+12ω−3ω2





9ω2 − 36ω − 24
  8+12ω−3ω2
6ω(4−ω) + 28 − 3ω = −9ω4+84ω3−256ω2+256ω−64
4ω(4−ω) , which is




Finally, at x = 1





2 (1 − ω)ω(1 − λ) ≤
0; at x = 3







max wrto λ: λ = 1
2 if ω < 4
5, λ = 1 if ω > 4
5. In the ﬁrst case, 15 · 1
2ω + 2 − 6ω − 12 · 1
2 = 3
2ω − 4 < 0; in
the second case, 15ω + 2 − 6ω − 12 = 9ω − 10 < 0.
Step 2.2.2 For ω ∈ [1, 1
λ], the inequality π′
H(pL+θ) ≤ 0 is satisﬁed Notice that the equation 2λx2−
(1 − λω + ω + 2λ)x+ω = 0 has two roots x1 = 1
4λ (1 + 2λ − λω + ω − X) and x2 = 1




2 ω2 − 2
 
3λ − 1 + 2λ
2 
ω + (2λ + 1)
2. Since x1 ∈ (0,1) and x2 > 1,18 we infer that
π′
H(pL + θ) ≤ 0 if and only if ˆ x ≥ x1.
18The inequality x1 > 0 is equivalent to 1 + 2λ − λω + ω > X, which after squaring reduces to 8λω > 0. The inequality
x1 < 1 is equivalent to 1 − 2λ − λω + ω < X, which holds if the left hand side is negative, otherwise after squaring we get an
equivalent inequality which boils down to ω < 1
λ. Finally, the inequality x2 > 1 is equivalent to X > λ(2+ω)−1−ω, and it
is satisﬁed if the right hand side is negative, otherwise after squaring we get an equivalent inequality which reduces to ω < 1
λ.








−(1 − λ)X3 + (−λ − 8λω + 3ω − 2λ
2 + 5λ
2ω)X2
+((7λ − 3)(λ − 1)





ω + 3 − 9λ − 4λ
3 + 16λ
2)X
+(3λ − 1)(λ − 1)
3 ω3 + λ(1 − λ)
 
10λ







2 − 3 + 4λ
4 + 18λ
 













   
−4λ
2ω + 2λ
2ω2 − λω − 4λω2 + 4λ − 1 + ω + 2ω2 
X
−2(1 − λ)3ω3 + (1 − λ)(8λ
2 + 7λ − 3)ω2 + 2λ(4λ
2 + 5λ − 5)ω − 8λ





2 [αλ(ω) + βλ(ω)X]
with α(λ,ω) = 2(1−λ)2ω2−(4λ




2−2λ+1. We show in the following that Ψ(x1) < 0 in the set K = {(λ,ω) : λ ∈ (1
2,1]
and ω ∈ [1, 1
λ]}. We use numerical methods to ﬁnd that β(λ,ω) < 0 below the medium thick curve, and
β(λ,ω) > 0 above that curve; notice that the set K includes some points (λ,ω) such that β(λ,ω) > 0,
even though it is impossible to see this set in the picture. Furthermore, numerical methods to ﬁnd that
α(λ,ω) > 0 to the left of the very thick curve, and α(λ,ω) < 0 to the right of that curve. Also notice that
the two curves cross at (λ,ω) = (2
3, 3
2).














To the left of the dashed curve we have α > 0 and β < 0, thus αX+β ≤ 0 is equivalent to β
2−α2X2 ≥ 0,
which reduces to −14λω + 6ω + 12λ − 3 ≥ 0. Let µ(λ,ω) ≡ −14λω + 6ω + 12λ − 3 and notice that
for each λ > 1
2, µ is decreasing with respect to ω. For λ ≤ 2
3, the maximal ω is 1










4 ], we can solve α(λ,ω) = 0 with respect to ω and









2 − 50λ + 9
 






















To the right of the dashed curve, the inequality αX + β ≤ 0 obviously holds if α < 0 and β < 0.
However, there is a very small region in which α < 0 and β > 0 (it consists of points such that ω is close
to 1
λ and 2
3 < λ < 1 √
2). In such a case, αX + β ≤ 0 is equivalent to α2X2 − β
2 ≥ 0, which reduces to
−µ(λ,ω) ≥ 0. At the points in the lower part of the region β = 0, hence −µ(λ,ω) ≥ 0 holds since it is
equivalent to α2X2 −β
2 ≥ 0, that is α2X2 ≥ 0. Moreover, the function −µ is increasing in ω and thus we
infer that −µ(λ,ω) ≥ 0 is satisﬁed at each point in the region.







θ2(pH −p1H)), which is convex in p1H and π′
H(pL+θ) = 1−λ
2λ−1[2λx2−(1 − λω + ω + 2λ)x+ω] ≤ 0
(proved above) and π′
H(pH + θ) = 0. Hence π′
H(p1H) < 0 holds for p1H ∈ (pL + θ,pH + θ).
Step 2.3 If type L and type H of supplier 2 play pL and pH in (3), respectively, then playing
pL is a best reply for type L of supplier 1 The payoﬀ function of type L is πL(p1L) ≡ (p1L −
cL)[λF(pL − p1L) + (1 − λ)F(pH − p1L)], and
π′
L(p1L) = [λf(pL − p1L) + (1 − λ)f(pH − pL)][
λF(pL − p1L) + (1 − λ)F(pH − p1L)
λf(pL − p1L) + (1 − λ)f(pH − p1L)
− p1L + cL]
Step 2.1 reveals that if λ ≤ 1
2, then the second factor in π′
L(p1L) is strictly decreasing in p1L — interpret
pL−p1L as y — for p1L ∈ [pL−θ,pH +θ). Therefore π′
L(pL) = 0 implies π′
L(p1L) > 0 for p1L ∈ [pL−θ,pL)
and π′
L(p1L) < 0 for p1L ∈ [pL,pH + θ). If instead λ > 1
2, then the second factor in π′
L(p1L) is strictly
decreasing in p1L for p1L ∈ [pL − θ,pH); therefore π′
L(p1L) > 0 for p1L ∈ [pL − θ,pL) and π′
L(p1L) < 0 for








(pL − p1L +
1
2θ
(pL − p1L)2) +
1 − λ
θ
(pH − p1L +
1
2θ












L(p1L) < 0 holds for any p1L ∈ (pH,pL + θ) since cL < cH implies π′
L(p1L) < π′
H(p1L)
and we know that π′
H(p1L) < 0 for any p1L ∈ (pH,pL + θ).
Values of p1L in [pL + θ,pH + θ]. Then π′
L(p1L) = (1 − λ)(1
2 + 1
θ(pH − p1L) + 1
2θ2(pH − p1L)2) − (1 −
λ)(p1L − cL)(1
θ + 1
θ2(pH −p1L)) and π′
L(p1L) < 0 for any p1L ∈ (pL + θ,pH + θ) since π′
L(p1L) < π′
H(p1L)
(as cL < cH) and π′
H(p1L) < 0 for any p1L ∈ (pL + θ,pH + θ].
6.1.2 The case in which ∆ > θ
Step 1 Derivation of equilibrium bids and the payoﬀ of the buyer When ∆ > θ, the ﬁrst order
conditions (13)-(14) boil down to
λ
2






= (pH − cH)
1 − λ
θ
Thus we obtain pL = cL +( 1
λ − 1
2)θ, pH = cL +σ + 1
2θ as in (7), and the inequality ∆ > θ is equivalent to
σ > 1
λθ. Given pL,pH, the payoﬀ of type L is
(2−λ)2
4λ θ and the payoﬀ of type H is 1
4(1 − λ)θ.
19The payoﬀ of the buyer is
UB
C = λ
2(E[max{q1,q2}] − pL) + (1 − λ)2(E[max{q1,q2}] − pH) + 2λ(1 − λ)[E(q1) − pL]




2 − 16λ + 11)θ − (1 − λ)2σ
Step 2 Proof that pL,pH in (6) constitute a BNE if (λ,σ) belongs to C First notice that (λ,σ) ∈ C
implies pH−θ < pL+θ, and therefore for a supplier choosing price z the probability η(z) of winning depends
on z as follows
η(z) =

      
      
1 − λ + λF(pL − z) for pL − θ ≤ z < pL
1 − λ + λF(pL − z) for pL ≤ z < pH − θ
(1 − λ)F(pH − z) + λF(pL − z) for pH − θ ≤ z < pL + θ
(1 − λ)F(pH − z) for pL + θ ≤ z < pH
(1 − λ)F(pH − z) for pH ≤ z < pH + θ
=

      
      
1 − λ + λ(1
2 + 1
θ(pL − z) − 1
2θ2(pL − z)2) for pL − θ ≤ z < pL
1 − λ + λ(1
2 + 1
θ(pL − z) + 1
2θ2(pL − z)2) for pL ≤ z < pH − θ
(1 − λ)(1
2 + 1
θ(pH − z) − 1
2θ2(pH − z)2) + λ(1
2 + 1
θ(pL − z) + 1
2θ2(pL − z)2) for pH − θ ≤ z < pL + θ
(1 − λ)(1
2 + 1
θ(pH − z) − 1
2θ2(pH − z)2) for pL + θ ≤ z < pH
(1 − λ)(1
2 + 1
θ(pH − z) + 1
2θ2(pH − z)2) for pH ≤ z < pH + θ
Step 2.1 If type L and type H of supplier 2 play pL and pH in (6), respectively, then playing
pL is a best reply for type L of supplier 1 Consider ﬁrst type L, for which the payoﬀ from playing
z is πL(z) = (z − cL)η(z). We prove that z = pL is a best reply for type L.
• Values of z in [pL − θ,pL) = [cL + ( 1
λ − 3
2)θ,cL + ( 1
λ − 1














is positive for each z ∈ [cL + ( 1
λ − 3
2)θ,cL + ( 1
λ − 1
2)θ) since cL + ( 1
λ − 3
2)θ − cL − 2−9λ
6λ θ > 0.
• Values of z in [pL,pH−θ) = [cL+( 1
λ− 1
2)θ,cL+σ− 1














2)θ−z) is negative for
any z ∈ (cL+( 1
λ− 1
2)θ,cL+σ− 1
2θ) since σ < 5λ+1




• Values of z in [pH − θ,pL + θ) = [cL + σ − 1
2θ,cL + ( 1
λ + 1

















2θ2 (z − cL)2 − 3θ−2σ+2σλ
θ2 (z − cL) +
−4λ(1−λ)σ2+4λ(1−λ)θσ+(4+11λ−6λ2)θ2
8λθ2 .
Case of λ ≤ 1
2. Then π′

















given σ ≤ 5λ+1
3λ θ.
Case of λ > 1
2. Then π′




3λ θ) < 0 and π′
L is convex, thus
if π′
L(cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ) ≤ 0 then π′
L(z) ≤ 0 for any z ∈ [cL + σ − 1




L(cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ) > 0, then there exists a ˆ z > cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ which is a local maximum point for
πL, and we analyze it in next step.
• Values of z in [pL+θ,pH) = [cL+( 1
λ + 1
2)θ,cL+σ+ 1












is decreasing since π′′
L(z) = 1−λ





3λ θ. We ﬁnd that π′
L(cL +( 1
λ + 1
2)θ) = (1 − λ)
−λ2σ2+λ(4+3λ)θσ−(3+5λ)θ2




2)θ) ≤ 0 then π′
L(z) < 0 for any z ∈ [cL +( 1
λ + 1
2)θ,cL +σ + 1









4σ2 − 4θσ + 25θ





2)3/2]. It turns out that πL(ˆ z) is increasing in
σ,19 and at σ = 5λ+1






2 + 28λ + 4
 3/2
)θ,
which is smaller than
(2−λ)2
4λ θ for any λ > 2
5.
• Values of z in [pH,pH +θ] = [cL+σ+ 1
2θ,cL+σ+ 3









2θ2 (z−cL)2−(1 − λ) 3θ+2σ
θ2 (z−cL)+(1 − λ)
(3θ+2σ)2
8θ2
is negative for any z ∈ [cL +σ + 1
2θ,cL +σ + 3
2θ) since π′
L is convex and π′




L(cL + σ + 3
2θ) = 0.
Step 2.2 If type L and type H of supplier 2 play pL and pH in (6), respectively, then playing
pH is a best reply for type H of supplier 1 Now we consider type H, for which the payoﬀ from
playing z is πH(z) = (z−cH)η(z). We prove that z = pH is a best reply for type H. Since the cost of type
H is cH = cL+σ, we do not need to consider z < cL+σ. Precisely, we start with z ∈ [cL+σ,cL+( 1
λ + 1
2)θ)
if σ < ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ; otherwise we start with z ∈ [cL + σ,cL + σ + 1
2θ).
• Values of z in [cL + σ,pL + θ) = [cL + σ,cL + ( 1
λ + 1

















2θ2 (z − σ − cL)2 − 3θ−2σλ
θ2 (z − σ − cL) +
[(λ+2)θ−2λσ]2+7λ(1−λ)θ2
8λθ2 .
Case of λ ≤ 1
2. Then π′
H(z) > 0 for any z ∈ [cL + σ,cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ) since π′
H is concave and
π′
H(cL + σ) =
[(λ+2)θ−2λσ]2+7λ(1−λ)θ2
8λθ2 > 0, π′
H(cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ) = (1 − λ)(σλ − θ)
(5λ+3)θ−3λσ
2θ2λ2 ≥ 0.
Case of λ > 1
2. We have seen above that π′
H(cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ) ≥ 0, and π′′
H(z) =
3(2λ−1)
θ2 (z − σ −
cL) − 3θ−2σλ
θ2 . We can prove that if λ ∈ (1
2, 5
6], then π′′
H(z) ≤ 0 for any z ∈ [cL + σ,cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ),
which implies that π′
H(z) > 0 for any z ∈ [cL + σ,cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ). Precisely, π′′




2λθ2(2λ(3 − 4λ)σ + 3(2λ
2 + λ − 2)θ) and (i) if 1
2 < λ < 3
4, then 2λ(3 − 4λ)σ + 3(2λ
2 + λ − 2)θ ≤
2λ(3 − 4λ) 5λ+1
3λ θ + 3(2λ
2 + λ − 2)θ = −1
3(22λ
2 − 31λ + 12)θ < 0; (ii) if 3




2λ(3 − 4λ)σ + 3(2λ
2 + λ − 2)θ < 0 since 3 − 4λ < 0 and 2λ
2 + λ − 2 < 0; (iii) if
√
17−1
4 ≤ λ ≤ 5
6,
then 2λ(3 − 4λ)σ + 3(2λ
2 + λ − 2)θ ≤ 2λ(3 − 4λ) θ
λ + 3(2λ
2 + λ − 2)θ = −λ(5 − 6λ)θ ≤ 0. If
λ > 5
6, we need to study the sign of π′′
H(cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ). This is positive for λ > 5
6, at σ = θ
λ; for a
larger σ, it may become negative. Hence π′
H has a minimum in the interval [cL + σ,cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ)
if λ > 5
6 and σ is close to θ
λ. Precisely, it is necessary that σ < 3
2
2λ2+λ−2
λ(4λ−3) θ, and we ﬁnd that the
minimum value is
−4λ2(3−2λ)σ2+12(2+λ−2λ2)θλσ−3θ2(4−28λ2+15λ+12λ3)






























25 (1 − λ)(6λ + 1)(6λ − 5)
 




• Values of z in [pL + θ,pH) = [cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ,cL + σ + 1
2θ). Then πH(z) = (z − cL − σ)(1 − λ)(1
2 +
1
θ(cL +σ + 1
2θ −z) − 1
2θ2(cL + σ + 1




θ2 (z −cL −σ + 7
6θ)(cL +σ + 1
2θ −z)
is positive for any z ∈ [cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2),cL + σ + 1
2θ) since cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ − cL − σ + 7
6θ > 0 given
σ < 5λ+1
3λ θ.20
19First set ω = σ
θ and notice that ω ≤ 5λ+1
3λ ≤ 5
2 for any (λ,σ) ∈ C. Then notice that 1
θπL(ˆ z) = −8ω3 + 12ω2 + 138ω −
71 + (4ω2 − 4ω + 25)3/2 which is increasing in ω for ω ∈ [1, 5
2].
20In case that σ > ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ, our proof for values of z in [cL + ( 1
λ + 1
2)θ,cL + σ + 1
2θ) covers the set of values of z in
[cL + σ,cL + σ + 1
2θ).
21• Values of z in [pH,pH +θ] = [cL+σ+ 1
2θ,cL+σ+ 3




2θ −z) + 1
2θ2(cL +σ + 1
2θ −z)2) and π′
H(z) =
3(1−λ)
2θ2 (z −cL −σ − 3
2θ)(z −cL −σ − 1
2θ) ≤ 0 for
any z ∈ (cL + σ + 1
2θ,cL + σ + 3
2θ].
6.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1(iii)
When λ = 1
2, a pure strategy BNE exists for any ω ≤ 2
√
3 − 1. For values of ω larger than 2
√
3 − 1,
a mixed-strategy symmetric BNE exists since for each type ik of supplier the payoﬀ function in (2) is
continuous in bids. Thus we can apply a standard existence result which can be found, for instance, in
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991 (Theorem 1.3 in Subsection 1.3.3).
The strategy proﬁles described by Proposition 1(ii) are such that each type L bids pa
L with probability
µ, bids pb
L with probability 1−µ, and each type H bids pH. We need to prove that for each ω ∈ {5
2,3, 7
2},
the corresponding strategy proﬁle in Proposition 1(ii) is a BNE. First notice that in each of the three cases
we have
pa
L − θ < pb
L − θ < pa
L < pH − θ < pb
L < pa
L + θ < pH < pb
L + θ < pH + θ (19)
Therefore the payoﬀ of type L of supplier 1 from bidding p1L ∈ [pa
L − θ,pH + θ], denoted with π1L(p1L),
is given by

                      



























































































































2θ2 if p1L ∈ [pb
L + θ,pH + θ]
Likewise, the payoﬀ of type H of supplier 1 from bidding p1H ∈ [pa
L−θ,pH+θ], denoted with π1H(p1H),
is given by

                      





























































































































2θ2 if p1H ∈ [pb
L + θ,pH + θ)
22We need to prove that for each ω ∈ {5
2,3, 7
2}, the prices pa
L,pb
L given by Proposition 1(iii) are both
maximum points for π1L, and that pH is a maximum point for π1H.21
We start by considering type L of supplier 1, and in order to simplify notation we deﬁne y as
p1L−cL
θ ,
and write the proﬁt of type L as a function of y: ˜ π1L(y) ≡ 1
θπ1L(cL +yθ) (we have inserted the factor 1
θ —
which is irrelevant from the point of view of the incentives of type L — in order to get a simpler expression
for ˜ π1L and ˜ π′
1L). Furthermore, we deﬁne a ≡
pa
L−cL
θ , b ≡
pb
L−cL
θ , and h ≡
pH−cH
θ . Then ˜ π1L is deﬁned as
follows as a function of y ∈ [a − 1,ω + h + 1]
˜ π1L(y) =

                     



















2 + b − y −
(b−y)2









2 + b − y −
(b−y)2
2 ]} if y ∈ [a,h + ω − 1]
y{1
2[1









2 + b − y −
(b−y)2
2 ]} if y ∈ [ω + h − 1,b)
y{1
2[1










2 } if y ∈ [b,a + 1)
y{1
2[1























                      
                      
−3
4µy2 − µ(1 − a)y + 1 − 1
4µ(1 − a)2 if y ∈ [a − 1,b − 1)
−3
4y2 + (µa + b − 1 − µb)y + 3
4 +
µ
4a(2 − a) +
1−µ
4 b(2 − b) if y ∈ [b − 1,a)
(3
2µ − 3
4)y2 + (b − µa − 1 − µb)y + 3
4 +
µ
4a(2 + a) +
1−µ
4 b(2 − b) if y ∈ [a,ω + h − 1)
 
3
2(µ − 1)y2 + (ω + h − 2 − µa + b − µb)y
+1
2(1 + ω + h) − 1
4(ω + h)2 +
µ
4a(2 + a) +
1−µ
4 b(2 − b)
 
if y ∈ [ω + h − 1,b)
(ω + h − 2 − µa − b + µb)y + 1
2(1 + ω + h) − 1
4(ω + h)2 +
µ
4a(2 + a) +
1−µ
4 b(2 + b) if y ∈ [b,a + 1)
−3




4(ω + h)2 + 1
4(1 − µ)(b + 1)2 if y ∈ [a + 1,ω + h)
(3
2 − 3
4µ)y2 + (µb − ω − h − 2 − b + µ)y + 1
4(1 + ω + h)2 + 1
4(1 − µ)(b + 1)2 if y ∈ [ω + h,b + 1)
3
4(y − 1+h+ω
3 )(y − 1 − h − ω) if y ∈ [b + 1,ω + h + 1]
The property that pa
L,pb
L are both maximum points for π1L is equivalent to the property that a,b are both
maximum points for ˜ π1L, and in order to prove this property we examine the sign of ˜ π′
1L. For instance, in








1H(pH) = 0, and indeed in order to ﬁnd pa
L,pb
L,µ,pH given by Proposition 1(iii) we have solved (using numerical methods)
the system given by these four equations, for ω ∈ { 5
2,3, 7
2}.
23the case of ω = 5




                    
                    
−0.74059875y2 + 0.5095082408y + 0.934276494 if y ∈ [0.515976,1.087441)
−0.75y2 + 0.523139314y + 0.9305707471 if y ∈ [1.087441,1.515976)
0.7311975y2 − 2.470807168y + 2.0652585 if y ∈ [1.515976,1.999498)
−0.0188025y2 − 0.471309168y + 1.065760437 if y ∈ [1.999498,2.087441)
−0.523641314y + 1.093070504 if y ∈ [2.087441,2.515976)
−0.74059875y2 + 1.960796927y − 0.4696262432 if y ∈ [2.515976,2.999498)
0.75940125y2 − 4.038199073y + 4.028867883 if y ∈ [2.999498,3.087441)
3
4y2 − 3.999498y + 3.998996063 if y ∈ [3.087441,3.999498]
and it is simple to see that ˜ π′
1L(y) > 0 in [0.515976,1.515976), ˜ π′
1L(y) < 0 in (1.515976,1.86315), ˜ π′
1L(y) >
0 in (1.86315,2.087441), ˜ π′
1L(y) < 0 in (2.087441,3.999498), and ˜ π1L(1.515976) = ˜ π1L(2.087441) =
1.14086. A similar argument applies when ω ∈ {3, 7
2}.
Regarding type H, we deﬁne y as
p1H−cH
θ and write the proﬁt of type H as a function of y: ˜ π1H(y) ≡
1
θπ1H(cH + yθ); again, the factor 1
θ is irrelevant from the point of view of the incentives of type H. Then
˜ π1H is deﬁned as follows as a function of y ∈ [a − 1 − ω,h + 1]:
˜ π1H(y) =

                     



















2 + b − y − ω −
(b−y−ω)2









2 + b − y − ω −
(b−y−ω)2
2 ]} if y ∈ [a − ω,h − 1)
y{1
2[1









2 + b − y − ω −
(b−y−ω)2
2 ]} if y ∈ [h − 1,b − ω)
y{1
2[1










2 } if y ∈ [b − ω,a − ω + 1)
y{1
2[1























                                   
                                   
−3
4µy2 + µ(a − ω − 1)y + 1 − 1
4µ(a − ω − 1)2 if y ∈ (a − 1 − ω,b − 1 − ω)
 
−3
4y2 + (µa − 1 + b − ω − µb)y
+3
4 + 1
4µ(a − ω)(2 − a + ω) + 1
4(1 − µ)(b − ω)(2 − b + ω)
 




4)y2 + (b − 1 − ω − µa − µb + 2µω)y
+3
4 + 1
4µ(a − ω)(2 + a − ω) + 1
4 (1 − µ)(b − ω)(2 − b + ω)
 
if y ∈ [a − ω,h − 1]
 
3
2(µ − 1)y2 + (h − 2 − µa + 2µω + b − ω − µb)y
+2+2h−h2
4 + 1
4µ(a − ω)(2 + a − ω) + 1
4(1 − µ)(b − ω)(2 − b + ω)
 
if y ∈ [h − 1,b − ω)
 
(ω + h − 2 − µa − b + µb)y + 1
4(2 + 2h − h2)
+1
4µ(a − ω)(2 + a − ω) + 1
4(1 − µ)(b − ω)(2 + b − ω)
 
if y ∈ [b − ω,a − ω + 1)
 
−3
4µy2 + (h − 2 + µ + (µ − 1)(b − ω))y
+1
4(1 + 2h − h2) + 1
4 (1 − µ)(b + 1 − ω)2
 
if y ∈ [a − ω + 1,h)
 
3
4(2 − µ)y2 + (−h − 2 + µ + (µ − 1)(b − ω))y
+1
4(h + 1)2 + 1
4(1 − µ)(b + 1 − ω)2
 






(1 + h − y) if y ∈ [b − ω + 1,h + 1]
The property that pH is a maximum point for π1H is equivalent to the property that h is a maximum
point for ˜ π1H, and in order to prove this property we examine the sign of ˜ π′
1H. For instance, in the case of
ω = 5
2 we have a = 1.515976, b = 2.087441, µ = 0.987465, h = 0.499498. Clearly, a type H will not choose
y ≤ 0 and ˜ π′




      
      
−0.523641314y + 0.4385188615 if y ∈ [0,0.015976)
−0.74059875y2 − .5078655729y + 0.4384558532 if y ∈ [0.015976,0.499498)
0.75940125y2 − 1.506861573y + 0.5632049792 if y ∈ [0.499498,0.587441)
3
4y2 − 1.499498y + 0.5621235629 if y ∈ [0.587441,1.499498]
and it is simple to see that ˜ π′
1H(y) > 0 in [0,0.499498), ˜ π′
1H(y) < 0 in (0.499498,1.499498]. A similar
argument applies when ω ∈ {3, 7
2}.
In order to evaluate UB









L) + (1 − µ)2E(max{q1,q2} − pb











L) + (1 − µ)E(max{q1 − pb
L,q2 − pH})
 
Moreover, E(max{q1,q2}) = q+ 2

















θ2dq2dq1. Then for each ω ∈ {5
2,3, 7
2} we obtain UB
C as described by Proposition 1(iii).
256.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In this proof we use SA to denote the standard auction environment described in subsection 3.2. In that
setting there exists a symmetric BNE in which both bidders bid according to a function β if and only if
for any vi
(vi − bi)Pr{bi > β(vj) for j  = i}
is maximized with respect to bi at bi = β(vi)
(20)
Step 1 For any symmetric BNE in the PR setting there exists a symmetric BNE in the SA environment,
and viceversa.
Proof First assume that P satisﬁes (8) and notice from (9)-(10) that the optimal score oﬀered by type ci,qi,
qi −P(ci,qi), depends only on vi. We denote by S(vi) this score, which means that qi − P(ci,qi) = S(vi).
Condition (20) is thus satisﬁed with the bidding function S. Hence, to each symmetric BNE under PR we
can associate a symmetric BNE in SA.
Now assume that β satisﬁes (20) and deﬁne P(ci,qi) = qi − β(qi − ci); we verify that P satisﬁes (8). We
know that (9) can be written as maxbi(vi −bi)Pr{bi > β(vj) for j  = i}, and bi = β(vi) solves this problem
because (20) holds. Thus, pi = P(ci,qi) as deﬁned above solves (9). Hence, to each symmetric BNE in SA
we can associate a BNE in PR.
Step 2 The unique symmetric BNE in PR is (11).
Proof Step 1 establishes a one-to-one correspondence between symmetric BNE in PR and in SA. Since we




G(vi)dt is the unique symmetric BNE in SA (in which v is the lowest possible




G(qi−ci)dt], as stated in (11).
In each state of the world, B selects the supplier which oﬀers the highest score, that is he selects supplier
i if and only if qi−P(ci,qi) > qj−P(cj,qj). Given (11), this inequality is equivalent to β(qi−ci) > β(qj−cj),
which reduces to qi − ci = vi > qj − cj = vj since β is strictly increasing. The expected payoﬀ of B is
equal to the payoﬀ of a seller in SA, that is the expected second highest valuation in view of the revenue
equivalence theorem.
6.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Let ˜ G(v) ≡ G2(v)+2G(v)[1−G(v)] = 1−[1−G(v)]2 denote the c.d.f. of min{v1,v2}. Then E[min{v1,v2}] =
  ¯ q−cL
q−cH vd ˜ G(v) and in case that σ ≤ θ we ﬁnd
E[min{v1,v2}] =
  ¯ q−cL
q−cH
vd ˜ G(v) = [v ˜ G(v)]
¯ q−cL
q−cH −
  ¯ q−cL
q−cH
˜ G(v)dv




1 − (1 − (1 − λ)









1 − (1 − (1 − λ)
v + cL + σ − q
θ
− λ









1 − (1 − (1 − λ + λ















2 = q − cL +
1
3




  ¯ q−cL
q−cH












[1 + 2λ(1 − λ)(3 − ω)ω2]θ
In case that σ > θ we ﬁnd
E[min{v1,v2}] =
  ¯ q−cL
q−cH
vd ˜ G(v) = [v ˜ G(v)]
¯ q−cL
q−cH −
  ¯ q−cL
q−cH
˜ G(v)dv




1 − (1 − (1 − λ)












1 − (1 − (1 − λ + λ





= q − cL +
1
3
(1 + λ − λ
2)θ − (1 − λ
2)σ = q − cL +
1
3
[1 + λ − λ





  ¯ q−cL
q−cL−σ
G(v)[1 − G(v)]dv =
1
3
(1 − 2λ + 2λ
2)θ + 2λ(1 − λ)σ = [
1
3
(1 − 2λ + 2λ
2) + 2λ(1 − λ)ω]θ
6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We ﬁrst notice that for given q1,q2, the ﬁrst score auction we are considering is equivalent to a standard
ﬁrst price auction with two bidders in which the bidders’ values are asymmetrically (and independently)
distributed such that the set of possible values for bidder 1 is {q1 −cH,q1 −cL}, the set of possible values
for bidder 2 is {q2−cH,q2−cL} and Pr{v1 = q1−cL} = λ = Pr{v2 = q2−cL}. Precisely, consider supplier
ik, which wins if and only if his opponent jh bids pjh such that qi − pik > qj − pjh, and in this case ik
earns a proﬁt equal to pik − ck. Let vik = qi − ck and sik = qi − pik. Then supplier ik wins if and only if
sik > sjh, and in such a case his payoﬀ is vik − sik, just like in the standard ﬁrst price auction in which
sik denotes the monetary bid of bidder ik. Therefore there is a one-to-one correspondence between BNE
in the two settings, and in Proposition 1 in Doni and Menicucci (2011) we prove that a unique equilibrium
outcome exists in a standard ﬁrst price auction; thus we obtain the same result for the ﬁrst score auction
under policy PU.22
We prove in the following that the strategy proﬁles described by Proposition 3 are indeed BNE. For
each supplier ik, given the bids of the types of supplier j, let wi(pik) and πik(pik) denote respectively his
probability of winning (which does not depend on the type k) and his payoﬀ when bidding pik.
(i) Type 1L and 1H. Both type 2L and type 2H oﬀer a score of q1 −cL. Therefore the payoﬀ of 1L is
zero if he oﬀers as speciﬁed by Proposition 3(i), and in order to win he needs to bid below cL. This yields
a negative payoﬀ in case of victory, and therefore his strategy in Proposition 3(i) is a best reply. A very
similar argument applies for type 1H.
Type 2H. Given the strategies in Proposition 3(i), the payoﬀ of 2H is t + cL − cH (notice that
t + cL − cH > 0 since λt > σ). It is obviously unproﬁtable for him to bid below t + cL, since then he still
wins with certainty but his revenue is smaller. Regarding bids above t + cL, the strategies of 1L and 1H
need to be such that no p > t + cL is proﬁtable. We prove that this is the case if, for instance, Φ1L is the
22Strictly speaking, Proposition 1 in Doni and Menicucci (2011) is stated with reference to a tie-breaking rule which is
diﬀerent fromt the tie-breaking rule considered in this paper, but in fact the tie-breaking rule is irrelevant for the case in
which the distribution of values of one bidder is obtained by shifting the distribution of values of the other bidder.
27uniform distribution on [cL,αcL] and Φ1H is the uniform distribution on [cH,αcH] with α > 1 and close to 1.
Precisely, if 2H bids p2H ∈ (t+cL,t+αcL], then w2(p2H) = 1−λ+λ(1−Pr{p1L < p2H−t}) = 1−λ
p2H−t−cL
(α−1)cL
and π2H(p2H) = (p2H−cH)[1−
λ(p2H−t−cL)
(α−1)cL ] and it is simple to see that π2H is decreasing in (t+cL,t+αcL]
for α close to 1. For bids in (t + αcL,t + cH], the resulting score is between q1 − cH and q1 − αcL, thus
w2(p2H) = 1 − λ and π2H(p2H) = (1 − λ)(p2H − cH) for p2H ∈ (t + αcL,t + cH]; thus π2H is increasing in
this interval, with π2H(t + cH) = (1 − λ)t, which is smaller than t − σ since λt ≥ σ. Finally, if 2H bids





(α−1)cH ], and it is simple to see that π2H is decreasing in (t+cH,t+αcH]
for α close to 1.
Type 2L. Given the strategies in Proposition 3(i), the payoﬀ of 2L is t. Thus we need to prove that
(p2L−cL)w2(p2L) ≤ t for any p2L ≥ t+cL When arguing about type 2H we have proved that (p−cH)w2(p) ≤
t+cL −cH for any p > t+cL, and this property can be written as (p−cL)w2(p)+σ ≤ t+σw2(p) for any
p > t + cL, which implies (p − cL)w2(p) ≤ t for any p ≥ t + cL.
(ii) Let ˜ p be the largest solution to h(p) ≡ (1 − λ)p2 − [(1 − 2λ)t + (1 − λ)(cH + cL)]p + (1 − λ)(t +
cH)cL − λtcH = 0, that is










[t + (1 − λ)σ]2 − 4λ(1 − λ)t2 (21)
and notice that h(t+cL) = t(λt−σ) < 0, h(cH) = −(1−λ)tσ < 0, h(t+cH) = λt2 > 0. This implies that
max{t + cL,cH} < ˜ p < t + cH and t + cL < ˆ p < ˜ p, given ˆ p = (1 − λ)˜ p + λ(t + cL).
Type 1H. Given Φ2L,Φ2H, each type of supplier 2 oﬀers a score larger or equal to q1−cH. Hence, the
same argument given for type 1H in the proof of Proposition 3(i) applies here.
Type 1L. Given Φ2L,Φ2H, we show that π1L(p1L) = (1 −λ)(˜ p−t−cL) > 0 for any p1L ∈ [ˆ p−t,cH),
and π1L(p1L) < (1 − λ)(˜ p − t − cL) if p1L / ∈ [ˆ p − t,cH).
If p1L ∈ [ˆ p − t, ˜ p − t), then the score oﬀered by 1L belongs to (q2 − ˜ p,q2 − ˆ p] and w1(p1L) = 1 − λ +
λ[1 − Φ2L(t + p1L)] = (1 − λ)
˜ p−t−cL
p1L−cL , π1L(p1L) = (1 − λ)(˜ p − t − cL). Likewise, if p1L ∈ [˜ p − t,cH) (which
corresponds to a score in (q1 −cH,q2 − ˜ p]) then w1(p1L) = (1−λ)[1−Φ2H(t+p1L)] = (1−λ)
˜ p−t−cL
p1L−cL and
π1L(p1L) = (1 − λ)(˜ p − t − cL). Hence, π1L(p1L) = (1 − λ)(˜ p − t − cL) > 0 for any p1L ∈ [ˆ p − t,cH).
No p1L / ∈ [ˆ p − t,cH) is proﬁtable for 1L since (i) if p1L > cH, then w1(p1L) = 0 and π1L(p1L) = 0;
(ii) if p1L < ˆ p − t, then w1(p1L) = 1 (since his score is larger than q2 − ˆ p) but π1L(p1L) < ˆ p − t −
cL = (1 − λ)(˜ p − t − cL); (iii) if p1L = cH, then 1L may win only tying with type 2H, which occurs
with probability (1 − λ)(1 −
t+cH−˜ p
σ ) = (1 − λ)
˜ p−t−cL
σ (see Φ2H), and thus w1(cH) = (1 − λ)
˜ p−t−cL
2σ ,
π1H(cH) = (1 − λ)
˜ p−t−cL
2 < (1 − λ)(˜ p − t − cL).
Type 2H. Given Φ1L, we show that π2H(p2H) = (1 − λ)t for any p2H ∈ [˜ p,t + cH] and π2H(p2H) <
(1 − λ)t for p2H / ∈ [˜ p,t + cH].
If p2H ∈ [˜ p,t+cH] (which corresponds to a score in [q1−cH,q2−˜ p]), then w2(p2H) = 1−λ+λ[1−Φ1L(p2−
t)] =
(1−λ)t
p2−cH and π2H(p2H) = (1 − λ)t.
No p2H / ∈ [˜ p,t + cH] is proﬁtable for 2H since (i) Φ1H is such that type 2H has no incentive to bid
above t + cH (for instance, this is the case if Φ1H is the uniform distribution on [cH,αcH] with α > 1
and α close to 1); (ii) if p2H ∈ [ˆ p, ˜ p) (which corresponds to a score in (q2 − ˜ p,q2 − ˆ p]), then w2(p2H) =
1 − λ + λ[1 − Φ1L(p2 − t)] =
ˆ p−cL
p2H−cL and π2H(p2H) =
(p2H−cH)(ˆ p−cL)
p2H−cL , which is increasing in p2H; (iii) if
p2H < ˆ p, then w2(p2H) = 1 and π2H(p2H) = p2H − cH < ˆ p − cH = π2H(ˆ p).
Type 2L. Given Φ1L, we show that π2L(p2L) = ˆ p − cL for any p2L ∈ [ˆ p, ˜ p] and π2L(p2L) < ˆ p − cL for
any p2L / ∈ [ˆ p, ˜ p].
28We already know that w2(p2L) =
ˆ p−cL
p2L−cL if p2L ∈ [ˆ p, ˜ p] and w2(p2L) =
(1−λ)t
p2−cH if p2L ∈ (˜ p,t+cH]. Therefore
π2L(p2L) = ˆ p − cL if p2L ∈ [ˆ p, ˜ p] and π2L(p2L) = (1 − λ)t
p2L−cL
p2L−cH if p2L ∈ (˜ p,t + cH], which is decreasing
in p2L. No bid below ˆ p is proﬁtable for 2L since w2(p2L) = 1 and π2L(p2L) = p2L − cL < ˆ p − cL for any
p2L < ˆ p. Finally, no bid above t + cH is proﬁtable since Φ1H is such that type 2L has no incentive to bid
above t +cH (for instance, this is the case if Φ1H is the uniform distribution on [cH,αcH] with α > 1 and
α close to 1).
Evaluation of Pr{1L def 2L} Notice that
Pr{1L def 2L} = Pr{q1 − p1L > q2 − p2L} = Pr{p2L > t + p1L} =
  ˜ p−t
ˆ p−t
Φ′










(p+t−cH)2 for p ∈ (˜ p − t,cH)
(22)
we obtain
Pr{1L def 2L} =
  ˜ p−t
ˆ p−t
ˆ p − cL
λ(p1 + t − cL)2
1 − λ
λ
˜ p − t − p1
p1 − cL
dp1 =
(ˆ p − cL)(1 − λ)
λ
2
  ˜ p−t
ˆ p−t
˜ p − t − p1




˜ p − t − p1
(p1 + t − cL)2(p1 − cL)
dp1 =
˜ p − cL − t
t2 ln
       
p1 − cL
p1 − cL + t
        +
˜ p − cL
t(p1 − cL + t)
to obtain
  ˜ p−t
ˆ p−t
˜ p − t − p1
(p1 + t − cL)2(p1 − cL)
dp1 =
˜ p − cL − t
t2 ln
       
(˜ p − t − cL)(ˆ p − cL)
(˜ p − cL)(ˆ p − t − cL)
        −
˜ p − ˆ p
t(ˆ p − cL)
and ﬁnally
Pr{1L def 2L} =
(ˆ p − cL)(1 − λ)
λ
2
  ˜ p−t
ˆ p−t
˜ p − t − p1
(p1 + t − cL)2(p1 − cL)
dp1
=
(ˆ p − cL)(1 − λ)(˜ p − cL − t)
λ
2t2 ln
       
(˜ p − t − cL)(ˆ p − cL)
(˜ p − cL)(ˆ p − t − cL)
        −
(1 − λ)(˜ p − ˆ p)
λ
2t
Evaluation of Pr{1L def 2H} Notice that
Pr{1L def 2H} = Pr{q1 − p1L > q2 − p2H} = Pr{p2H > t + p1L}




1L(p1)[1 − Φ2H(t + p1)]dp1
and using again (22) we obtain
Pr{1L def 2H} =
1
λ
˜ p − ˆ p







(p1 + t − cH)2(1 −






˜ p − ˆ p
˜ p − cL
+















       
p1 − cL
p1 + t − cH
        +
1










σ(˜ p − cH)
t(˜ p − t − cL)
+
˜ p − cH − t
(t − σ)t(˜ p − cH)
and ﬁnally
Pr{1L def 2H} =
1
λ
˜ p − ˆ p
˜ p − cL
+










˜ p − ˆ p
˜ p − cL
+
(1 − λ)t(˜ p − cL − t)
λ(t − σ)
2 ln
σ(˜ p − cH)
t(˜ p − t − cL)
+
(1 − λ)(˜ p − cL − t)(˜ p − cH − t)
λ(t − σ)(˜ p − cH)
6.5 Proof of Corollary 2
We have explained in the text that uB
PU(q1,q2) = q1 − cL when λt ≥ σ. When λt < σ we can evaluate
uB
PU(q1,q2) as the diﬀerence between the social surplus ssPU(q1,q2) and the suppliers’ payoﬀ uS
PU(q1,q2):
uB
PU(q1,q2) = ssPU(q1,q2) − uS
PU(q1,q2). Precisely,
ssPU(q1,q2) = λ
2(q2 − cL − tPr{1L def 2L}) + λ(1 − λ)(q2 − cH − (t − σ)Pr{1L def 2H})
+(1 − λ)(q2 − λcL − (1 − λ)cH)
= q2 − cL − (1 − λ)σ − λ
2tPr{1L def 2L} − λ(1 − λ)(t − σ)Pr{1L def 2H}
Moreover, in the proof of Proposition 3(ii) we see that the rents of types 1L, 2L, 2H are (1−λ)(˜ p−t−cL),
ˆ p − cL, (1 − λ)t, respectively. Hence
uS
PU(q1,q2) = λ(1 − λ)(˜ p − t − cL) + λ(ˆ p − cL) + (1 − λ)2t
= (1 − λ)
2 t + λ(1 − λ)σ + λ
 
[t + (1 − λ)σ]2 − 4λ(1 − λ)t2
in which the second equality is obtained using ˆ p = (1 − λ)˜ p + λ(t + cL) and (21). From ssPU(q1,q2) −
uS
PU(q1,q2) we obtain the expression of uB
PU(q1,q2) provided by Corollary 2 for the case of λt < σ.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 4
(ii) In view of Propositions 1(ii) and Corollary1(i), we ﬁnd that UB
C −UB
PR = 2λ(1−λ)σ− 1
6(2λ
2−14λ+13)θ,
which yields the result.
(i) The proof is organized in 9 steps.
Step 1 There exists a unique solution to Ψ(x) = 0 [i.e., equation (18)] in (0,1), which we denote with ˆ x,
and Ψ(x) < 0 for x ∈ [0, ˆ x), Ψ(x) > 0 for x ∈ (ˆ x,1].
Proof The proof is found in proof of Proposition 1.
Step 2 Let ω = σ/θ. When σ ≤ θ, the inequality UB
PR > UB
C is equivalent to (1 − 2λ)Γ(ˆ x) > 0 with




2ω2λ(1 − 2λ)(1 − λ)(3 − ω) + (12λ
2 − 12λ + 6)ω + 14 − 4λ
 
x + 6ω
30Proof When σ ≤ θ, the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ of the buyer under PR and his payoﬀ under C is
UB
PR − UB
C = (q − cL +
1
3
θ − (1 − λ)ω(1 + λω −
1
3
λω2)θ) − (q − pL +
2
3
θ − (1 − λ)(1 − λˆ x +
1
3
λˆ x2)ˆ ∆) (23)




(1 + 2λ)ˆ x − 2(2 + λω) + 2ω
ˆ x
2(1 − 2λ)









6ˆ x(1 − 2λ)2(1 − 2λ)Γ(ˆ x)
Step 3 There exists a unique solution to Γ(x) = 0 in (0,1), which we denote with x′, and Γ(x) > 0 for
x ∈ (0,x′), Γ(x) < 0 for x ∈ (x′,1).
Proof We ﬁnd that Γ(0) = 6ω > 0 and Γ(1) = 2λ(2λ − 1)(λ − 1)ω3−6λ(2λ − 1)(λ − 1)ω2+12λ(1 − λ)ω−
12λ + 24λ
2 − 8λ
3 − 5; we prove that vλ(ω) ≡ Γ(1) is negative, which implies that a solution to Γ(x) = 0
exists in (0,1). Since v′′
λ(ω) = 12λ(2λ − 1)(1 − λ)(1 − ω), it follows that v′′
λ(ω) ≥ 0 if λ ≥ 1
2; then from
vλ(0) = −λ
2 − (1 − λ)(5 + 17λ − 8λ
2) < 0, vλ(1) = −λ
3 − (1 − λ)(5 + 9λ − 15λ
2) < 0 we infer that
vλ(ω) < 0 for any ω ∈ [0,1] if λ ≥ 1
2. For λ < 1
2, we see that vλ(ω) < 0 for any ω ∈ [0,1] since
v′
λ(ω) = 6λ(1 − λ)(2 − 2ω + ω2 − 2λω2 + 4λω) is positive for any ω ∈ (0,1), and vλ(1) < 0 (mentioned
above).
We now show that Γ is strictly convex; this implies that the solution x′ to Γ(x) = 0 is unique and that
Γ(x) > 0 for x ∈ (0,x′), Γ(x) < 0 for x ∈ (x′,1). Indeed, Γ′′(x) = 18−24λ+24λ
2+12λ(2λ − 1)(1 − λ)(3x−
x2), and since 18 − 24λ + 24λ
2 > 0 for any λ ∈ (0,1) we infer that Γ′′(x) > 0 for λ ≥ 1
2. If instead λ < 1
2,
then we exploit 3x − 2x2 ≤ 3
2 for x ∈ (0,1) and thus Γ′′(x) ≥ 18 − 24λ + 24λ
2 + 12λ(2λ − 1)(1 − λ) 3
2 =
6(3 − 7λ + 13λ
2 − 6λ
3) > 0.




C for any ω ∈ (0,1] and any λ ∈ (0, 1
2).
Proof From Ψ[ξ(ω,λ)] > 0 and Step 1 we infer that ˆ x < ξ(ω,λ). From Γ[ξ(ω,λ)] > 0 and Step 3 we infer
that Γ(ˆ x) > 0, thus UB
PR > UB
C since λ < 1
2.
Step 5 Let ξ(ω,λ) ≡

   

























2 for ω ∈ (5
6,1]
.Then Ψ[ξ(ω,λ)] > 0 for any ω ∈ (0,1]
and any λ ∈ (0, 1
2).
Proof Using ξ(ω,λ) we obtain
Ψ[ξ(ω,λ)] =

   
   
2ω(1−2λ)
15625 ψλ1(ω) for ω ∈ (0, 5
12]
ω(1−2λ)












ψλ1(ω) = −4λ(2λ + 5)(1 − λ)(λ
2 + 2λ + 5)2ω2 − 50(λ
2 + 2λ + 5)(2λ
3 + 3λ
2 + 6λ − 10)ω + 625λ
2
ψλ2(ω) = −λ(2λ + 5)(1 − λ)(4λ
2 + 8λ + 15)2ω2 − 10(4λ
2 + 8λ + 15)(8λ
3 + 12λ




−2λ(8λ + 21)(1 − λ)
 









2 + 21λ − 69
 
ω + 625(72λ




−3λ(λ + 2)(1 − λ)(14 + 9λ + 6λ
2)2ω2
−10(14 + 9λ + 6λ
2)(12λ
3 + 12λ
2 + 7λ − 38)ω − 400(10 + 3λ − 6λ
2)
 
Now we prove that ψλ1(ω) > 0 for any ω ∈ [0, 5
12], ψλ2(ω) > 0 for any ω ∈ [ 5
12, 7
10], ψλ3(ω) > 0 for any
ω ∈ [ 7
10, 5
6], and ψλ4(ω) > 0 for any ω ∈ [5
6,1]. The proof relies on the fact that, for i = 1,2,3,4, ψλi is
concave and is positive at the extreme points of the interval to which ψλi refers.
• ψλ1(ω) > 0 for any ω ∈ [0, 5
12] since ψλ1(0) = 625λ


























1152 > 0 for
any λ ∈ (0, 1
2).
• ψλ2(ω) > 0 for any ω ∈ [ 5
12, 7






















192 > 0, ψλ2( 7
10) = 1675 − 245




















400 > 0 for
any λ ∈ (0, 1
2).
• ψλ3(ω) > 0 for any ω ∈ [ 7
10, 5













































288 > 0 for any λ ∈ (0, 1
2).























128 > 0, ψλ4(1) = 1320 − 3330λ
3 − 945λ





7 > 1320 − 3330(1
2)3 − 945(1
2)4 = 13515
16 > 0 for any λ ∈ (0, 1
2).
Step 6 For the same ξ(ω,λ) introduced in Step 5, the inequality Γ[ξ(ω,λ)] > 0 holds for any ω ∈ (0,1]
and any λ ∈ (0, 1
2). In view of Steps 4 and 5, we conclude that UB
PR > UB
C for any ω ∈ (0,1] and any
λ ∈ (0, 1
2).











2 + 2λ + 5
  
2λ


























2 − 16λ + 10
 





We use γλ1(ω) to denote the term in parenthesis and notice that
γ′′
λ1(ω) = 12λ(1 − λ)
 
λ
2 + 2λ + 5
 
   
2λ













is negative for ω ∈ (0, 5
12].23 Hence γλ1 is concave and γλ1(ω) > 0 for any ω ∈ (0, 5
12] since γ1(0) =





















8 > 0 for λ ∈ (0, 1
2).
23γ′′
λ1 is increasing and γ′′
λ1( 5
12) = −5λ(1 − λ)(λ2 + 2λ + 5)(26875 + 3600λ + 2280λ2 + 416λ3 + 24λ4 − 48λ5 − 8λ6) < 0.












2 + 8λ + 15
  
4λ


























2 − 54λ + 35
 




We use γλ2(ω) to denote the term in parenthesis and notice that
γ′′
λ2(ω) = 6λ(1 − λ)
 
4λ
2 + 8λ + 15
 
   
4λ













is negative for ω ∈ ( 5
12, 7
10].24 Hence γλ2 is concave and γλ2(ω) > 0 in ( 5
12, 7
10] since γλ2( 5


























2304 > 0 and γ2( 7
10) = 78000 − 932845



























800 > 0 for λ ∈ (0, 1
2).











27 + 17λ + 8λ
2  
8λ
































We use γλ3(ω) to denote the term in parenthesis and notice that
γ′′
λ3(ω) = 12λ(1 − λ)
 
27 + 17λ + 8λ
2 
   
8λ










4 − 476550 − 68850λ − 54075λ
2
 
is negative for ω ∈ ( 7
10, 5
6].25 Hence γλ3 is concave and γλ3(ω) > 0 for any ω ∈ ( 7
10, 5































































is decreasing in λ and at λ = 1




























2 − 36λ + 412
  








2 + 252λ + 1796
  









2 − 55λ + 38
 





We use γλ4(ω) to denote the term in parenthesis and notice that
γ′′
λ4(ω) = 6λ(1 − λ)
 




















2 is increasing and γ′′
2( 7
10) = 3
5λ(1 − λ)(4λ2+8λ+15)(448λ6+2688λ5+4016λ4−1856λ3−34540λ2−58200λ−258375) <
0.
25γ′′
λ3 is increasing and γ′′
λ3( 5
6) = 10λ(1−λ)(27+17λ+8λ2)(512λ6+3264λ5+6360λ4+2465λ3−23985λ2−45441λ−130302) <
0.
33is negative for ω ∈ (5


































10 > 0 for λ ∈ (0, 1
2).






64 , and the inequality 8395909
64 −479664λ+248208λ
2 < 0
requires λ > 13
40. For λ > 13
40, we have that γλ4(1) > 8395909








40)8, and this expression negative requires
λ > 7
18. For λ > 7
18 we have that γλ4(1) > 8395909
64 − 479664λ + 248208λ
2 + 379368( 7
18)3 + 542520( 7
18)4 +
65313( 7
18)5 + 181143( 7
18)6 + 48384( 7
18)7 + 4104( 7
18)8, and this expression negative requires λ > 9
20. For
λ > 9














C for any ω ∈ (0,1] and any λ ∈ (1
2,1).
Proof From Ψ[ξ(ω,λ)] < 0 and Step 1 we infer that ξ(ω,λ) < ˆ x. From Γ[ξ(ω,λ)] < 0 and Step 3 we infer
that Γ(ˆ x) < 0, thus UB
PR > UB
C by Step 2 since λ > 1
2.

















2 for ω ∈ (7
8,1]
.Then Ψ[ξ(ω,λ)] < 0 for any ω ∈ (0,1]
and any λ ∈ (1
2,1].






λ(1 − λ)(3 + 2λ)
2 ω2 + 2(3 + 2λ)
 
4λ
2 + 4λ − 7
 
ω + 16 − 32λ
 
We use ψλ5(ω) to denote the term inside the parenthesis and notice that ψλ5(ω) < 0 for any ω ∈ (0, 58
100]










for λ ∈ (1
2,1).27








2 ω2 − 3(2λ + 3)(λ + 1)ω + 9
 
We use ψλ6(ω) to denote the term inside the parenthesis and notice that ψλ6(ω) < 0 for any ω ∈ ( 58
100, 7
8]
since ψλ6 is convex and ψλ6( 58
100) = 189
50 − 5017


























16 < 0. for λ ∈ (1
2,1).
For ω ∈ (7
8,1) we have
Ψ[ξ(ω,λ)] =






2 − 4λ − 2
 2





ω − 225λ + 1125
 
Let ψλ7(ω) denote the term inside the parenthesis and notice that ψλ7(ω) < 0 for any ω ∈ (7
8,1) since
ψλ7 is convex and ψλ7(7
8) = 1305
2 − 5807









6 < 0, ψλ7(1) =





6 < 0 for λ ∈ (1
2,1).
26γ′′
λ4 is increasing and γ′′
λ4(1) = −6λ(1 − λ)(26 − 6λ2 − 9λ)(14 + 9λ + 6λ2)3 < 0.
27Precisely, ψλ5( 58
100) is convex in λ and has negative value at λ = 1
2 (−10759
625 ) and at λ = 1 (−51
5 ).
34Step 9 For the same ξ(ω,λ) introduced in Step 8, the inequality Γ[ξ(ω,λ)] < 0 holds for any ω ∈ (0,1]
and any λ ∈ (1
2,1]. In view of Steps 7 and 8, we conclude that UB
PR > UB
C for any ω ∈ (0,1] and any
λ ∈ (1
2,1).








−λ(2λ + 11)(1 − λ)(2λ + 3)
 
4λ
2 − 4λ + 49
 
ω3
+24λ(1 − λ)(2λ + 3)
 
4λ






2 − 12λ + 7
 




We use γλ5(ω) to denote the term in parenthesis and notice that γ′′
λ5(ω) = −6λ(2λ + 11)(1 − λ)(2λ + 3)(4λ
2−
4λ + 49)ω + 48λ(1 − λ)(2λ + 3)
 
4λ
2 + 12λ + 73
 
is positive for ω ∈ (0, 58
100].28 Hence γλ5 is convex and
γλ5(ω) < 0 for any ω ∈ (0, 58




























2 λ − 111665747
2 λ
2) < 0 for any λ ∈ (1
2,1).








−2λ(1 − λ)(λ + 4)(λ + 1)
 
λ
2 − λ + 7
 
ω3 + 18λ(1 − λ)(λ + 1)
 
λ
2 + 2λ + 10
 
ω2
+27(1 − λ)(3 − 2λ)(λ + 1)ω + 54λ − 108
 
We use γλ6(ω) to denote the term in parenthesis and notice that γ′′
λ6(ω) = −12λ(1−λ)(λ+4)(λ+1)(λ
2−λ+
7)ω+36λ(1 − λ)(λ + 1)(λ











































64 λ + 343
256λ
6 − 297
8 < 0 for any λ ∈ (1
2,1).










4λ + 2 − λ
2  






















2 − 4λ − 2
  
2λ
2 − 7λ + 9
 
ω − 6750λ




We use γλ7(ω) to denote the term inside the parenthesis and notice that
γ′′
λ7(ω) = −12λ(1 − λ)
 
4λ + 2 − λ
2  
















2 + 64λ + 241
 
































for any λ ∈ (1
2,1).
6.7 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) From the remarks stated shortly before Proposition 5 we see that (i) for (q1,q2) ∈ Q3, uB
PU(q1,q2) −
uB
PR(q1,q2) = (1 − λ)σ; (ii) for (q1,q2) ∈ Q1 ∪ Q2, uB
PU(q1,q2) − uB
PR(q1,q2) > −λσ since uB
PU(q1,q2) >
28Precisely, γ′′
λ5 is decreasing and γ′′
λ5( 58
100) = 3
25λ(1 − λ)(2λ + 3)(13569 + 3234λ + 556λ2 − 232λ3) > 0.
29Precisely, γ′′
λ6 is decreasing and γ′′
λ6( 7
8) = 3
2λ(1 − λ)(λ + 1)(44 + 27λ + 3λ2 − 7λ3) > 0.
30Precisely, γ′′
λ7 is decreasing and γ′′
λ7(1) = 48λ(1 − λ)(2λ2 − 8λ + 11)(−λ2 + 4λ + 2)3 > 0.
35q1 − cH and uB
PR(q1,q2) ≤ q1 − cL − (1 − λ)σ. Therefore
UB
PU − UB




in which the equality holds since Pr{(q1,q2) ∈ Q1 ∪ Q2 ∪ Q3} = 1
2 and thus Pr{(q1,q2) ∈ Q1 ∪ Q2} =
1
2 −Pr{(q1,q2) ∈ Q3}. For σ about 0 we ﬁnd that Pr{(q1,q2) ∈ Q3} is about 1
2, and hence UB
PU −UB
PR > 0.
(ii) We prove that UB
PR > UB
PU when ω > max{
3(1+λ)
2(3−λ), 3λ−1
2(1−λ)} by showing that uB
PR(q1,q2) > uB
PU(q1,q2)
for any feasible (q1,q2). Precisely, we show that for any feasible (q1,q2), uB
PR(q1,q2) is larger than B’s
payoﬀ under PU even if we suppose that the highest valuation supplier always wins under PU.31 That is






2(3−λ) if λ ≤ 3
5
3λ−1
2(1−λ) if λ > 3
5
.
Step 1 The case of λ ≤ 3
5 Suppose that ω ≥
3(1+λ)
2(3−λ) and notice that
3(1+λ)
2(3−λ) ≤ 1 when λ ≤ 3
5.
Step 1.1 ω ≥ 1 The condition ω ≥ 1 is equivalent to σ ≥ θ, thus any feasible (q1,q2) (such that q2 ≥ q1)
belongs to Q1 and from Corollary 2 we infer that
uB
PU(q1,q2) = q1 − cL + λ(2 − λ)t − (1 − λ
2)σ − λ
 
[t + (1 − λ)σ]2 − 4λ(1 − λ)t2 (24)
−λ
2tPr{1L def 2L} + λ(1 − λ)(σ − t)Pr{1L def 2H}
Since σ − t ≥ σ − θ ≥ 0 and Pr{1L def 2H} < 1, if follows that λ(1 − λ)(σ − t)Pr{1L def 2H} ≤
λ(1−λ)(σ−t). Using λ
2tPr{1L def 2L} > 0 we conclude that uB




[t + (1 − λ)σ]2 − 4λ(1 − λ)t2+λ(1−λ)(σ−t) = q1−cL−(1−λ)σ+λt−λ
 
[t + (1 − λ)σ]2 − 4λ(1 − λ)t2.
Moreover, for each (q1,q2) ∈ Q1 we know that uB
PR(q1,q2) = q1 − cL − (1 − λ)σ − λ(1 − λ)(σ − t) and
thus uB
PU(q1,q2) < uB
PR(q1,q2) holds if q1 − cL − (1 − λ)σ + λt − λ
 
[t + (1 − λ)σ]2 − 4λ(1 − λ)t2 ≤
q1−cL−(1−λ)σ−λ(1−λ)(σ−t). This inequality is equivalent to 2(1−λ)σ ≥ (3λ−1)t, which is satisﬁed




2(3−λ) ≤ ω < 1 The inequality ω ≥
3(1+λ)
2(3−λ) is equivalent to σ ≥
3(1+λ)
2(3−λ)θ, and since λ <
3(1+λ)
2(3−λ),
it implies that σ > λθ; thus q2 − q1 ≤ σ
λ holds for any feasible (q1,q2). Hence any feasible (q1,q2) (such
that q2 ≥ q1) belongs to Q1 if q2 − q1 ≤ σ, otherwise it belongs to Q2.
If (q1,q2) ∈ Q1, using σ ≥ t = q2 −q1 we can argue like in Step 1.1 to ﬁnd that the inequality 2(1−λ)σ ≥
(3λ−1)t implies uB
PU(q1,q2) < uB
PR(q1,q2). The inequality 2(1−λ)σ ≥ (3λ−1)t holds for any (q1,q2) ∈ Q1
given that σ ≥ t and λ ≤ 3
5.
If conversely (q1,q2) ∈ Q2, then σ − t < 0 and therefore uB




[t + (1 − λ)σ]2 − 4λ(1 − λ)t2. Moreover, for each (q1,q2) ∈ Q2 we know that uB
PR(q1,q2) =
q1 − cL − (1 − λ)σ and thus uB
PU(q1,q2) < uB




[t + (1 − λ)σ]2 − 4λ(1 − λ)t2 ≤ q1−cL−(1−λ)σ. This inequality is equivalent to 3(1+λ)t ≤ 2(3−λ)σ,
which is satisﬁed for any t ∈ [σ,θ] given σ ≥
3(1+λ)
2(3−λ)θ.
Step 2 The case of λ > 3
5 Assume that ω ≥ 3λ−1
2(1−λ) and notice that 3λ−1
2(1−λ) > 1 when λ > 3
5. Then
ω > 1 holds and we can argue as in Step 1.1 to prove that the inequality 2(1 − λ)σ ≥ (3λ − 1)t implies
uB
PU(q1,q2) < uB
PR(q1,q2). The inequality 2(1 − λ)σ ≥ (3λ − 1)t holds for any t ∈ [0,θ] given ω ≥ 3λ−1
2(1−λ).
31That is, even if Pr{1L def 2L} = 0 and Pr{1L def 2H} = 1 for q1−cL > q2−cH, Pr{1L def 2H} = 0 for q1−cL < q2−cH.
366.8 Proof of Proposition 6(ii)
Given λ = 1
2, in this proof we show that UB
PU > UB
PR if ω < ω∗ and UB
PU < UB
PR if ω > ω∗. Then
Proposition 4 implies straightforwardly Proposition 6.
From Proposition 5(ii), with λ = 1
2, we know that UB
PR > UPU for ω ≥ 9




PR = q−cL+ 1
12(4−6ω−3ω2+ω3)θ [derived in Corollary 1(i)]. Recall from Subsection
3.3 that t denotes the diﬀerence q2 − q1, and to ﬁx the ideas (without loss of generality) we assume that
t ≥ 0. Given that λ = 1
2, the inequality λt < σ reduces to t < 2σ and thus the set Q3 is empty if ω > 1
2,
whereas Q3  = ∅ if ω ≤ 1
2. Therefore we distinguish these two cases.
Step 1 The case of ω ≤ 1
2 We need to derive UB
PU. From ω ≤ 1
2 we deduce that Q1,Q2,Q3 are all
non-empty sets, and when (q1,q2) ∈ Q1 ∪ Q2 — that is when t < 2σ — uB
PU(q1,q2) is given by (24) with
λ = 1
2. However, we can simplify this expression somewhat by deﬁning τ ≡ t
σ, that is τ =
q2−q1
σ , since then
from (21) and ˆ p = (1−λ)˜ p+λ(t+cL) we obtain ˜ p = cL+ 1
2(1+
√




and using (??), (??) we ﬁnd
Pr{1L def 2L} =
1
2τ2(1 + 2τ − 2τ2 +
√
1 + 4τ)ln









1 + 4τ − 2τ
2τ
Pr{1L def 2H} =
√
1 + 4τ − 3
2(τ − 1)
+ τ






1 + 4τ − 1
τ(1 +
√
1 + 4τ − 2τ)
Therefore uB









1 + 4τ − 1
τ(1 +
√




1 + 4τ + 2τ − 2τ2
2τ
ln









We have thus obtained uB
PU(q1,q2) when τ < 2. When instead τ ≥ 2, Corollary 2 reveals that uB
PU(q1,q2) =




q1 − cL if τ ≥ 2
q1 − cL + ω
4θη(τ) if τ < 2
Ex ante, from the point of view of the buyer, τ is a random variable with support [0, 1
ω], given our
assumption of t ≥ 0, and using the fact that the density for (q1,q2) is constantly equal to 2
θ2 in Q1∪Q2∪Q3,
we can obtain the c.d.f. Υ and the density Υ′ of τ, for τ ∈ [0, 1
ω]:


























PU = q − cL + (1
3 − 2.15462ω2 + 1.70024ω3)θ. Since UB
PR = q − cL + 1
12(4 − 6ω − 3ω2 + ω3)θ,
numerical methods reveal that UB
PU > UB
PR for ω < ω∗, and UB
PR > UB
PU for ω ∈ (ω∗, 1
2].
Step 2 The case of ω ∈ (1
2, 9
10) We prove that UB
PR > UPU for each ω ∈ (1
2, 9
10). Since ω > 1
2,
the inequality t < 2σ holds for any feasible (q1,q2) and thus uB
PU(q1,q2) is given by (24) with λ = 1
2.
Hence uB







4(σ − t) if t ≤ σ (as Pr{1L def 2L} > 0 and
Pr{1L def 2H} < 1) that is uB
PU(q1,q2) < q1 − cL − 1
2ωθ(1 − τ + 1
2
√
1 + 4τ) if τ ≤ 1; on the other hand,
uB






4σ2 if t > σ (as Pr{1L def 2L} > 0 and Pr{1L def 2H} > 0)
37that is uB


































120 (ω + 4)
2  
ω(ω + 4))θ. Since UB




PU reduces to d3(ω) ≡ −3 + 3ω − 7ω2 + 19
10ω3 + 1
10(ω + 4)2 
ω(ω + 4) > 0. For




ω(ω + 4) > 3
4 + 3






5 +6ω − 229
40 ω2 + 41
20ω3 ≡ d4(ω), and d4(ω) > 0 for each ω ∈ (1
2, 9
10) since d4 is increasing
and d4(1
2) = 1
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